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INTRODUCTION 
While talking about the regulation of fully autonomous2 
motor vehicles—cars that can drive themselves—might seem 
premature, some of the technologies that will make 
autonomous motor vehicle operation possible are already 
appearing in vehicles.  Indeed, the first demonstrations of 
some of these technologies date as far back as 1939.3  Recent 
research by companies, such as Google,4 and the Grand and 
 
 2. This Article generally uses the term “autonomous,” instead of the term 
“automated.”  We have chosen to use the term “autonomous” because it is the 
term that is currently in more widespread use (and thus is more familiar to the 
general public).  However, the latter term is arguably more accurate.  
“Automated” connotes control or operation by a machine, while “autonomous” 
connotes acting alone or independently.  Most of the vehicle concepts (that we 
are currently aware of) have a person in the driver’s seat, utilize a 
communication connection to the cloud or other vehicles, and do not 
independently select either destinations or routes for reaching them.  Thus, the 
term “automated” would more accurately describe these vehicle concepts.  
 3. General Motors’ (GM) 1939–40 New York World’s Fair exhibit entitled 
“Futurama” was one of the early examples of an autonomous vehicle concept.  
Its concept involved automated vehicles traveling in dedicated lanes and being 
guided safely through traffic by radio control signals from a traffic control 
tower.  See RANDAL O’TOOLE, GRIDLOCK: WHY WE’RE STUCK IN TRAFFIC AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 189–91 (2009).  
 4. Google has developed a small fleet of autonomous vehicles that rely on 
video cameras, radar sensors, laser range finders, and maps collected by the 
company and are always manned with a driver trained to take over by 
disengaging cruise control when necessary.  Sebastian Thrun, What We’re 
Driving At, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Oct. 9, 2010, 12:00 PM), 
 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
1426 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
Urban Challenges5 sponsored by the Defense Advanced 
Research Programs Agency (DARPA) have sought to develop 
autonomous driving technologies further with an eye toward 
large-scale civilian and military deployment.  
Notwithstanding the steady progress being made, systems 
designed to assume complete control from the driver, 
including the performance of safety critical operations, are 
not yet feasible as they are incapable at this stage in their 
technological development of resolving and navigating 
through all of the many different driving scenarios that might 
arise.  Although there are many technical challenges that 
must be overcome before vehicles can drive themselves 
reliably in all scenarios, many autonomous driving 
technologies are being incorporated into vehicles sold today 
for use in discrete scenarios.  In the near future, more and 
more vehicles will be equipped with various autonomous 
driving technologies, creating the potential for large safety 
and mobility (i.e., congestion reduction) benefits.  The 
mobility benefits would, in turn, have fuel consumption and 
carbon dioxide emission reduction benefits. 
Government actions can influence the extent and the 
speed with which autonomous driving technologies are 
adopted.  For example, in the most recent revision of the New 
Car Assessment Program (NCAP),6 the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) initiated the practices 
of making recommendations to consumers regarding those 
advanced crash avoidance technologies that the agency 
deemed most promising (based on existing data regarding 
 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html.  Sebastian 
Thrun is a Google Vice President and Fellow, and a Research Professor at 
Stanford University.  Sebastian Thrun, STANFORD.EDU, http://robots.stanford 
.edu/index.html (last visited May 13, 2012).  As of late March 2012, the mileage 
total had reached 200,000 miles.  GOOGLE+, https://plus.google.com/u/0/1168990 
29375914044550/posts/MVZBmrnzDio#116899029371168990293/posts/MVZBm
rnzDio (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
 5. See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, History, DARPA.MIL, 
http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/Archives.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) 
(listing archival material relating to these challenges). 
 6. NCAP enables the agency to publish comparative safety information, 
which encourages manufacturers to voluntarily improve safety in their vehicles.  
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 810 698, THE NEW CAR 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR FUTURE PROGRAM 
ENHANCEMENTS (2007), available at http://www.safercar.gov/staticfiles/DOT/ 
safercar/pdf/810698.pdf. 
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their effectiveness) and of identifying those vehicles that are 
equipped with these systems.7  In addition, NHTSA has 
publicly announced that it will work toward a decision8 in 
2013 on whether to initiate rulemaking to mandate and set 
performance requirements for various advanced crash 
avoidance technologies whose effectiveness could be increased 
through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications.9  As the 
United States government agency responsible for the safety of 
new motor vehicles, NHTSA will inevitably play a vital role in 
monitoring, encouraging, conducting research regarding and, 
as necessary, regulating autonomous driving technologies 
through the application of the agency’s authority over motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.  As motor vehicles 
incorporating these technologies become an increasingly 
larger part of the overall fleet of vehicles in operation, the 
crash data are expected to begin to show the significant safety 
benefits of these technologies.  Where needed to address 
safety risks arising from any of the vehicles with these 
technologies, the agency will take appropriate action.  
NHTSA has broad authority to regulate these new 
technologies and currently has various regulatory 
tools/methods that can be applied in addressing these new 
potential challenges. 
With this perspective in mind, this Article begins with a 
brief overview of some of the autonomous driving technologies 
 
 7. See Press Release, NHTSA, Auto Safety Agency Unveils List of Vehicles 
to be Tested as Part of Revamped Safety Ratings Program (Oct. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2011/ci.NHT 
SA+Announces+Model+Year+2012+Vehicles+to+be+Rated+Under+Government
+5-Star+Safety+Ratings+Program.print. 
 8. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA VEHICLE SAFETY 
AND FUEL ECONOMY RULEMAKING AND RESEARCH PRIORITY PLAN 2011–2013 
(2011), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/2011-
2013_Vehicle_Safety-Fuel_Economy_Rulemaking-Research_Priority_Plan.pdf. 
 9. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications for Safety is the wireless exchange 
of data between nearby vehicles that offers the opportunity for significant safety 
improvements.  By exchanging vehicle-based data regarding position, speed, 
and location (at a minimum), V2V communications enables a vehicle to: sense 
threats and hazards with a 360-degree awareness of the position of other 
vehicles and the threat or hazard they present; calculate risk; issue driver 
advisories or warnings; or take pre-emptive actions to avoid and mitigate 
crashes.  Connected Vehicles Applications: Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) 
Communications for Safety, RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN. (Aug. 16, 
2012, 12:02 PM), http://www.its.dot.gov/research/v2v.htm [hereinafter 
Connected Vehicles Applications]. 
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(including advanced crash avoidance technologies) that lead 
to the autonomous motor vehicle.  Then, this Article reviews 
NHTSA’s regulatory authority and explores the possible role 
that the agency might play in the implementation of 
autonomous driving technologies.  Afterward, the Article 
evaluates some of the challenges of developing and drafting 
appropriate and effective standards for these new 
technologies, investigating defects, and encouraging 
voluntary adoption of safety technologies (through programs 
like NCAP).  In these sections, we conclude that (while 
additional research and information will likely be necessary) 
many of the current methods used by NHTSA can still be 
applied to these advanced technologies. 
I. TODAY’S ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES MAKE AUTONOMOUS 
MOTOR VEHICLES POSSIBLE 
It is important to understand at the outset that 
autonomous driving technologies do not represent a far-
fetched, futuristic concept.  There is a continuum of these 
technologies, and many of them are already available today.10  
As current advanced crash avoidance technologies become 
more developed and are able to work in conjunction with each 
other, vehicles will increasingly become able to drive 
autonomously.11 
A. Progressing from Driver Monitoring and Control to 
Vehicle Monitoring and Control 
For the purposes of this Article, we will be using the 
NHTSA approach to defining the different levels of 
autonomy12 (see below). In NHTSA’s research, the agency has 
 
 10. For example, as lane-keeping technology and adaptive cruise control 
mature, these two technologies could theoretically work together to enable a 
vehicle to drive autonomously in a lane of a limited access highway.  See Damon 
Lavrinc, Next Audi Flagship Will Drive Autonomously in Traffic Jams, 
AUTOBLOG (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:31 PM),   http://www.autoblog.com/2012/01/12/ 
next-audi-flagship-will-drive-autonomously-in-traffic-jams/ (Audi’s new system 
that will enable autonomous driving in traffic jam situations). 
 11. See Bill Howard, The Almost-Self-Driving Lincoln Won’t Let You Drive 
Hands-off, EXTREMETECH (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.extreme 
tech.com/extreme/107037-the-almost-self-driving-lincoln-won%E2%80%99t-let-
you-drive-hands-off (describing how automakers are linking current crash 
avoidance technologies to achieve low level automation). 
 12. For its own internal purposes, NHTSA uses the term “automation” 
 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
2012] POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF AMVS 1429 
used five categories to describe different levels of autonomy.  
These levels are shown in the following table.  
 
H
u
m
an
 
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
C
om
pu
te
r 
Non-
Auto. 
Auto.-
Assist’d 
Monitor’d 
Auto. 
Cond’l 
Auto. 
Full 
Auto. 
1. Non-Automated 
In this category, the human is in complete and sole 
fundamental control of the vehicle at all times.  While current 
vehicles (without any advanced crash avoidance technologies) 
can be included in this category, vehicles with warning 
systems that assist drivers also fall into this category.  
Vehicles equipped with these technologies will not assume 
control for any driving tasks, but will provide additional 
information to the driver and/or warn the driver of situations 
requiring immediate attention.  Navigational global 
positioning systems (GPS) are an example of a currently 
available technology which provides information useful to the 
overall task of driving, and potentially highly valuable to V2V 
communications.13  Lane Departure Warning (LDW) is an 
example of a currently available warning technology.14  This 
technology alerts the driver when his or her vehicle begins to 
drift out of the lane of travel.15  Like other information and 
 
instead of “autonomy” for the reasons explained in supra note 2.  
 13. At the heart of V2V communications is a basic application known as the 
Here I Am data message.  See Connected Vehicles Applications, supra note 9.  
This message can be derived using non-vehicle-based technologies such as GPS 
to identify location and speed of a vehicle, or vehicle-based sensor data wherein 
the location and speed data is derived from the vehicle’s computer and is 
combined with other data such as latitude, longitude, or angle to produce a 
richer, more detailed situational awareness of the position of other vehicles.  Id.   
 14. Lane Departure Warning is currently available on Infiniti and Mercedes 
Benz models among others.  E-Class Sedan, MERCEDES-BENZ USA, 
http://www.mbusa.com/mercedes/vehicles/class/features/class-E/bodystyle-
SDN/vehicle-safety (last visited Oct, 9, 2012); Infiniti M: Specifications and 
Options, INFINITI USA, http://www.infinitiusa.com/m/specs-options (last visited 
Oct, 9, 2012). 
 15. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 405, ADVANCED 
CRASH AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES (ACAT) PROGRAM – FINAL REPORT OF THE 
VOLVO-FORD-UMTRI PROJECT: SAFETY IMPACT METHODOLOGY FOR LANE 
DEPARTURE WARNING – METHOD DEVELOPMENT AND ESTIMATION OF BENEFITS 
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warning technologies, a LDW system does not intervene to 
prevent the driver from departing the lane.16  It merely 
monitors the lane markings on the roadway to determine 
whether the vehicle is keeping within its current driving 
lane.17  LDW systems can also warn the driver if lane 
makings cannot be detected or if the system malfunctions.18 
2. Automation-Assisted 
The “automation-assisted” category still leaves the 
driving authority squarely with the driver.  However, under 
limited normal driving or crash imminent circumstances, 
technologies in this category will take control away from the 
driver.  An example of this type of technology is the electronic 
stability control (ESC).  ESC systems use automatic 
computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to assist a 
driver in maintaining control in critical driving scenarios in 
which the vehicle is beginning to lose directional stability at 
the rear wheels (spin out) or directional control at the front 
wheels (plow out).19  Another advanced example of 
automation-assisted driving is a lane-keeping system that 
will actively steer a vehicle back toward the center of its lane 
when the system detects that the vehicle is drifting into an 
adjacent lane or is on a collision course with a vehicle in an 
adjacent lane.20 
 
14 (2010), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20 
Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/2010/811405.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA, 
ACAT PROGRAM]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.; FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
AND VOLUNTARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LANE DEPARTURE WARNING 
SYSTEMS ON-BOARD COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES (2005), available at 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/report/lane-
departure-warning-systems.htm. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control 
Systems; Control and Displays, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,236 (Apr. 6, 2007) (final rule) 
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).  NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
on May 23, 2012, proposing to require ESC on all vehicles with a gross vehicle 
weight rating over 26,000 pounds.  Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; 
Electronic Stability Control Systems for Heavy Vehicles, 77 Fed. Reg. 30766 
(proposed May 23, 2012) (to be codified 49 C.F.R. pt. 571), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-23/pdf/2012-12212.pdf.      
 20. NHTSA, ACAT PROGRAM, supra note 15, at 14.  NHTSA is currently 
conducting research on advanced braking technologies that utilize forward-
looking sensors to detect impending crashes and assist the driver in avoiding or 
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3. Monitored Automation 
The “monitored automation” category is the first category 
in which the technology will share the driving responsibility 
with the driver.  However, in this category, the human driver 
is expected to be ready to take control of the vehicle at all 
times.  Thus, the autonomous technology is only able to 
assume the responsibility of driving when the conditions 
permit.  For example, some vehicles on the market today are 
available with automatic parallel parking systems.  This type 
of technology differs from automation-assisted driving 
technologies because the driver gives a general command to 
the vehicle (e.g., “park in this space”) and the vehicle 
effectuates that command by assuming control of the steering 
and making the necessary steering calculations.21  Another 
potential example is the combination of adaptive cruise 
control with lane-keeping.  The combination of these two 
technologies would potentially enable vehicles to proceed 
down the freeway with little or no input from the driver.  
However, depending on the level of sophistication in this 
system, drivers might still be required to intervene at any 
moment (e.g., lane markings disappear and the vehicle can no 
longer position itself in the center of the lane). 
4. Conditional Automation 
In this category, the technology is sufficiently reliable 
such that the human driver is able to completely cede the 
driving responsibility to the autonomous driving system 
under certain circumstances.  This category differs from 
“monitored automation” systems as drivers using “conditional 
automation” systems would not need to be able to assume 
control of the vehicle within a moment’s notice.  In theory, the 
vehicle would be able to warn the driver of an impending 
condition sufficiently in advance so that the driver can safely 
 
mitigating these crashes.  See Advanced Braking Technologies that Rely on 
Forward-Looking Sensors; Request for Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 39561 (July 3, 
2012) (soliciting comment on test protocols used to evaluate sensor based 
dynamic braking systems and the performance of these systems), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-07-03/pdf/2012-16250.pdf.  
 21. See Doug Newcomb, Self-Parking Systems Comparison Test, EDMUNDS 
INSIDE LINE (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.insideline.com/features/self-parking-
systems-comparison-test.html. 
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take control.  However, the drivers would be expected to be 
available to take control when so warned. 
5. Full Automation 
As the final category in the above diagram, “full 
automation” driving encompasses all of the systems necessary 
for the vehicle to perform automatically and independently all 
driving tasks in all driving scenarios.  This vehicle would 
integrate various technologies from the previous three 
categories to perform all driving tasks such that a person is 
no longer driving.  An example of a technology in this 
category would be a vehicle that is capable of bringing the 
driver anywhere.  The only driver input would be the 
destination.  The vehicle would be responsible for all driving 
decisions and actions during travel. 
B. Connected Vehicle Technologies Can Reinforce and 
Complement Autonomous Technologies 
As an added dimension, it is important to note that the 
technologies on the continuum (stretching from today’s 
advanced crash avoidance technologies to tomorrow’s 
autonomous driving system) can use different methods for 
obtaining information to make judgments about a vehicle’s 
surroundings (such as through the use of sensors or 
communications with other vehicles/infrastructure).22 
Thus, an “autonomous motor vehicle” is a concept distinct 
from a “connected vehicle” (a vehicle which communicates 
with other vehicles or infrastructure).  A vehicle can perform 
autonomous driving functions without communicating with 
other vehicles, and a connected vehicle might have the ability 
to receive information and relay it to the driver, but might not 
have the ability to drive autonomously.  For example, the 
lane departure warning safety function described above could 
be accomplished through the use of only sensors/cameras or it 
 
 22. See, e.g., Kathleen Doheny, Technology Aimed at Helping Drowsy 
Drivers Stay Awake, EDMUNDS.COM (Jan. 12, 2012) 
http://www.edmunds.com/car-safety/technology-aimed-at-helping-drowsy-
drivers-stay-awake.html (stating that current forward collision warning and 
lane departure warning systems often use cameras and sensors).  See also 
Connected Vehicles Applications, supra note 9 (listing the various safety 
applications being researched for vehicle-to-vehicle communications, which 
includes forward collision warnings and lane change warnings). 
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could be accomplished through the use of a communication 
between vehicles identifying each vehicle’s position and 
heading.23  Further, as evidenced by Google’s autonomous 
motor vehicle project, autonomous driving can be possible 
through the use of cameras and sensors without any vehicle 
communications apart from map updates.24  While 
communications can be an enabling technology which can 
provide an effective means to augment or supplant the same 
functions of vehicle sensors and cameras, future deployment 
of autonomous motor vehicles or vehicles with advanced crash 
avoidance technologies (such as lane departure warnings) can 
occur independent of vehicle communications. 
NHTSA has been exploring the use of vehicle 
communications as a way to complement or (in some 
scenarios) act as an alternative for sensor-based detection for 
advanced crash avoidance systems.25  The research concept is 
that vehicles would transmit safety-related information (e.g., 
location, direction and speed) to each other so as to enable 
each vehicle to identify potential conflicts (i.e., collisions).  
After these conflicts are identified, vehicles could issue 
warnings for the driver or possibly take evasive or preemptive 
action in order to avoid or at least mitigate a crash.26  The 
research explores various types of crash scenarios that can be 
addressed through V2V communications and identifies seven 
crash scenarios that could be effectively addressed by this 
technology (such as forward collision, lane departure, and 
intersection movement assist).27  From these studies, it 
appears that vehicle communications have the potential to act 
 
 23. See Doheny, supra note 22. 
 24. See John Markoff, Smarter Than You Think: Google Cars Drive 
Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html. 
 25. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 492A, 
VEHICLE SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS APPLICATIONS (VSC-A) FINAL REPORT xi 
(2011), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20 
Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/2011/811492A.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA, 
VSC-A FINAL REPORT]. 
 26. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 373, USDOT 
CONNECTED VEHICLE RESEARCH PROGRAM: VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE SAFETY 
APPLICATION RESEARCH PLAN 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20Avoidance/Technical%20Pub
lications/2011/811373.pdf. 
 27. See NHTSA, VSC-A FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at xii. 
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not only as an enabling technology for autonomous motor 
vehicles, but also as a technology that can enhance an 
autonomous motor vehicle’s ability to identify potential 
problems and take appropriate actions to avoid them.  V2V 
communications have the potential to provide additional 
information to the autonomous motor vehicle (covering areas 
beyond the range of the on-board sensors) and enable more 
robust performance of autonomous driving technologies. 
While there is a significant degree of overlap between 
what vehicles can achieve using sensor-based crash avoidance 
technologies and what vehicles can achieve using V2V 
communications, there are some areas in which the 
capabilities of these systems differ.  Sensor-based 
technologies might have a greater capacity to avoid single 
vehicle crashes because V2V communications rely on the 
presence of other vehicles to avoid crashes while sensors have 
the ability to operate independently of other vehicles.  Sensor-
based technologies might enable a vehicle to determine its 
location more accurately in some settings, e.g., urban areas 
with tall buildings.28  Conversely, V2V communications might 
be able to prevent crashes that sensor-based crash avoidance 
technologies cannot because V2V communications systems 
can communicate information beyond the range of sensor-
based technologies.29   
As discussed below in the next section, legal issues that 
apply to autonomous motor vehicles and connected vehicles 
are closely related. 
II. NHTSA’S GENERAL AUTHORITY OVER MOTOR VEHICLE 
SAFETY 
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act (the “Safety Act” or “the Act”) in 1966 with the 
purpose of reducing deaths and injuries as a result of motor 
vehicle crashes and non-operational safety hazards 
 
 28. Jesse Levinson and Sebastian Thrun, Stanford University, 2010 IEEE 
International Conference on Robotics and Automation: Robust Vehicle 
Localization in Urban Environments Using Probabilistic Maps (May 3-8, 2010). 
 29. An example of such a scenario is an intersection crash for which V2V 
communications might be able to provide a warning that another vehicle is 
about to enter the intersection at a high rate of speed but a sensor-based system 
may not be able to provide such a warning because of the angle involved and the 
limited range of the sensors. 
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attributable to motor vehicles.30  The Act, as amended, is now 
codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101 et seq. 
To accomplish this purpose, the Act authorizes NHTSA to 
use several major tools to address motor vehicle safety 
concerns associated with motor vehicles31 and motor vehicle 
equipment.32  The Act authorizes the agency to set motor 
vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and motor 
vehicle equipment and requires the recall and remedy of 
vehicles and equipment that do not comply with the 
standards in place at the time of manufacture.33  It also 
authorizes NHTSA to conduct investigations about possible 
safety defects and requires the recall and remedy of motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment determined to have a 
safety defect.  We will briefly introduce each tool below. 
The Act mandates that the standards to be issued by 
NHTSA be “practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle 
safety and [be] stated in objective terms.”34  In order to issue a 
standard, NHTSA must determine that the vehicle or item of 
equipment falls under NHTSA’s authority (i.e., is a motor 
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment within the 
meaning of the Act), that there is a safety need, and that the 
standard will meet that need.  The Act also establishes a self-
certification framework for ensuring compliance with the 
safety standards.  Under this framework, NHTSA establishes 
performance standards35 for motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
equipment to which manufacturers of these products are 
required to certify that their products conform.  NHTSA does 
not certify or approve products. 
The agency does not regulate the actions of vehicle 
owners, the operation of motor vehicles on public roads or the 
maintenance and repair of vehicles-in-use.  Further, NHTSA 
 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1776, at 10 (1966). 
 31. See 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6) (2006). 
 32. See § 30102(a)(7). 
 33. Manufacturers must certify that their products comply with the 
applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) at the time of 
manufacture. 
 34. 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2006). 
 35. H.R. REP. 89-1719, at 15 (1966) (stating that, while Congress intended 
to protect the public from “inherently dangerous designs,” Congress did not 
intend for motor vehicle safety standards to directly address issues of vehicle 
design). 
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has only limited authority to prevent after-market 
modifications that remove or reduce the effectiveness of the 
federally-required safety features of a vehicle.  While various 
types of commercial entities are prohibited by the Act from 
making such modifications to motor vehicles owned by other 
parties, vehicle owners may modify their own vehicles.36  
Further, NHTSA does not have authority to require 
retrofitting of older vehicles with new safety equipment 
unless the vehicle is a commercial vehicle.37  Thus, NHTSA 
works with the States regarding the making of periodic 
inspections to ensure that certain basic safety equipment on 
vehicles remains intact and functional after vehicles cease to 
be new, i.e., after their first sale for purposes other than 
resale.38   
Manufacturers are obligated to recall and remedy 
without charge motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 
that are determined to fail to comply with one of the agency’s 
standards or to contain a defect that poses an unreasonable 
risk to motor vehicle safety.39  If NHTSA makes the 
determination, it must do so through a process that allows 
the affected manufacturer a chance to be heard.40  In almost 
all cases, however, the determination is made by the 
manufacturer (although often after the agency has initiated 
an investigation).41 
 
 
 36. The Safety Act expressly prohibits motor vehicle repair businesses from 
“mak[ing] inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in 
a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable 
[FMVSS].”  See 49 U.S.C. § 30122(b) (2006).   
 37. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.95(c) (2010) (delegating to NHTSA, in coordination 
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the powers 
vested in the Secretary of Transportation by subchapter III of chapter 311 of 
title 49 of the United States Code to promulgate safety standards for 
commercial motor vehicles and equipment subsequent to initial manufacture).   
 38. To aid the States in conducting inspections of used vehicles, 49 U.S.C § 
30126 directed NHTSA to establish safety standards for the inspection of used 
vehicles.  See 49 U.S.C. § 30126 (2006).  Pursuant to that direction, NHTSA 
established standards to be used by the States in conducting inspections.  See 
49 C.F.R. pt. 570 (2010). 
 39. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118, 30120 (2006). 
 40. § 30118(b). 
 41. See Christopher Jensen, 2010 a Record Year for ‘Voluntary’ Recalls, N.Y. 
TIMES WHEEL BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011, 11:33 AM), http://wheels.blogs.ny 
times.com/2011/01/20/2010-a-record-year-for-voluntary-recalls/. 
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In addition to setting mandatory vehicle safety standards 
to which vehicles must be certified, NHTSA also conducts the 
New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) that generates and 
provides the public with comparative performance ratings to 
encourage vehicle manufacturers to improve the safety of 
their vehicles voluntarily.  Since 1979, NHTSA has been 
giving safety ratings to certain new vehicles through NCAP.42  
Currently, “NHTSA rates a sample of new vehicles that are 
predicted to have high sales volume, those that have been 
structurally redesigned, or those with improved safety 
equipment.”43  Those vehicles are assigned a rating from one 
to five stars (lowest to highest) based on their success in 
frontal and side crash tests and in rollover resistance tests.44  
In the crash tests, anthropomorphic dummies are placed in 
the test vehicles.  The dummies are equipped with 
accelerometers that measure the forces to which the dummies 
are subjected in those tests.  Vehicles with body structures, 
energy absorbing materials and restraint systems that are 
relatively more effective in managing the crash forces receive 
higher scores. 
NCAP ratings are made publicly available and vehicle 
manufacturers may advertise these ratings, thus providing 
an incentive to achieve higher ratings.  High NCAP scores are 
widely used by vehicle manufacturers in advertising to 
demonstrate to potential buyers the safety attributes of the 
vehicles they produce.  Thus, through providing the public 
with objective information on the relative safety performance 
of new vehicles, NCAP has been successful in achieving its 
purpose of creating consumer awareness of those differences, 
thereby creating market forces that prompt vehicle 
manufacturers to make added safety improvements to their 
 
 42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-370, VEHICLE SAFETY: 
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENHANCE NHTSA’S NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
8 (2005). 
 43. See NHTSA 5-Star Ratings FAQ, SAFERCAR.GOV, 
http://www.safercar.gov/FAQ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 44. NHTSA’s NCAP program has been publishing comparative consumer 
information on frontal crashworthiness of new vehicles since 1979, on side 
crashworthiness since 1997, and on rollover resistance since January 2001.  
Consumer Information Regulations; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; 
Rollover Resistance, 66 Fed. Reg. 3388 (Jan. 12, 2001) (Response to Comments, 
Notice of Final Decision). 
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vehicles.45  Additionally, as a result of recent amendments by 
the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act—
“MAP-21,”46 the agency may require that additional types of 
NCAP information be displayed on the “Monroney label.” 
which is affixed to the side window of new automobiles.47  
Thus, consumers have this safety information at the point of 
sale 
Recently, NHTSA has begun under the NCAP Program to 
note online the presence in vehicle models of three types of 
voluntarily-installed crash avoidance systems: electronic 
stability control, lane departure warning and forward 
collision warning.  In order to have one of these crash 
avoidance systems listed on NCAP website (safercar.gov) for a 
vehicle model, the manufacturer must design the system so 
that it meets the minimum performance criteria established 
by the agency for that type of system. 
III. NHTSA’S BROAD AUTHORITY OVER AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENT 
The vehicle technologies that make autonomous 
operation possible are vastly different than those that existed 
when the Safety Act was enacted in 1966.  Then, the vehicle 
operating systems were largely mechanical and controlled by 
the driver via mechanical inputs and linkages.  Components 
and systems were either designed into the vehicle at the time 
 
 45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2. 
 46. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4348enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4348enr.pdf. 
 47. In 2005, Congress enacted the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), requiring 
automobile manufacturers to disclose NCAP ratings for new vehicles on 
Monroney labels as of September 1, 2007.  Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10307, 119 
Stat. 1941 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1232(g)–(h) (2006)).  This requirement 
was modified by the recent enactment of MAP-21.  Pub. L. No.112-141, § 31315, 
126 Stat. 405.  The amendment permits the agency to require ratings for 
additional aspects of safety performance on the Monroney labels.  Id.  Monroney 
labels are the labels placed on new automobiles with the manufacturer’s 
suggested retail price and other consumer information, as required in 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1231–1233 (2006).  On www.safercar.gov, NHTSA supplements the label 
information by indicating whether any one or more of three recommended 
advanced technology features (ESC, FCW, and LDW) comes as standard or 
optional equipment on particular vehicle models.  NHTSA 5-Star Ratings FAQ, 
supra note 43. 
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of original manufacture or were later attached to or 
physically carried in the vehicle.  Sensing of a vehicle’s 
performance and the roadway environment was done solely 
by the driver.  Today, an increasing number of vehicle 
functions are electronic.  These functions can be activated and 
controlled automatically by electronic control units.  Further, 
they can rely on electrical inputs from the driver or on 
information relayed from on-board sensors.  Increasingly, 
those on-board sensors monitor vehicle performance and the 
roadway environment.  The operation of those units can be 
substantially altered by post-manufacture software updates.  
In addition, advances in communications technology have 
made it possible for nomadic devices with vehicle-related 
applications to be brought into the vehicle.  Furthermore, 
devices located outside the vehicle can be used to affect and 
even control vehicle functions—including safety ones. 
NHTSA’s statutory authority over motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle equipment would allow the agency to establish 
safety standards applicable to vehicles that are originally 
manufactured with autonomous capabilities and to 
aftermarket equipment that could be added to vehicles that 
were not originally manufactured as autonomous vehicles so 
as to convert them into autonomous vehicles.  
The Safety Act gives NHTSA authority over new motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.  The Act defines a 
“motor vehicle” as “a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical 
power and manufactured primarily for use” on public roads.48  
The definition of “motor vehicle equipment” is broader and 
thus effectively establishes the limit of the agency’s authority 
under the Safety Act: 
(A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as 
originally manufactured; 
(B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold 
for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or 
 
 48. 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (a)(6) (2006).  The definition of “motor vehicle” 
includes trailers, but generally excludes vehicles that only use public roads for a 
limited duration to travel between worksites; vehicles that run exclusively on 
rails are also excluded from the definition of motor vehicle.  See § 30102 (a)(7) 
(“ ‘ [M]otor vehicle’ means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and 
manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does 
not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.”). 
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component, or as an accessory or addition to a motor 
vehicle; or 
(C) any device or an article or apparel, including a 
motorcycle helmet and excluding medicine or eyeglasses 
prescribed by a licensed practitioner, that— 
 (i)  is not a system, part, or component of a motor 
vehicle; and 
 (ii) is manufactured, sold, delivered, or offered to be sold 
for use on public streets, roads, and highways with the 
apparent purpose of safeguarding users of motor vehicles 
against risk of accident, injury, or death.49 
NHTSA’s authority to issue safety standards that apply 
to new motor vehicles would enable the agency to establish 
standards applicable to vehicles that were originally 
manufactured with autonomous capabilities.50  This authority 
would also extend to the individual pieces of equipment that 
are installed in new autonomous vehicles to enable these 
vehicles to drive autonomously.51  NHTSA could also establish 
safety standards that apply to equipment used to equip 
vehicles (not originally manufactured as autonomous 
vehicles) with autonomous technology using the agency’s 
authority over equipment that is sold as replacements or 
 
 49. See § 30102 (a)(7)(C); MAP-21, Pub. Law. 112-141, § 31201, 126 Stat. 
405, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4348enr/pdf/BILLS-
112hr4348enr.pdf.  Congress added subparagraph (C) to the statutory definition 
of “motor vehicle equipment” in 1970 when it amended the definition in order to 
clarify the Department’s authority over additional objects such as motorcycle 
helmets.  See S. REP. NO. 91-559, at 5 (1970).  However, Congress did not seek 
to limit the extension of the Department’s authority only to motorcycle helmets 
and instead utilized the broad terms “device, article, and apparel” to describe 
the universe of objects that are within the agency’s authority.  See id.  
Acknowledging the concerns of those who authored the House version of the 
amendatory language that utilizing the terms “device, article, and apparel” 
might unduly extend the Department’s authority to objects that have only a 
tangential relation to motor vehicle safety, the conference committee added a 
use restriction.  See id. Congress relaxed this use restriction in the statutory 
definition of “motor vehicle equipment” as part of the amendments to the Safety 
Act in MAP-21.  See MAP-21, Pub. Law. 112-141, § 31201, 126 Stat, 405. Thus, 
the Department’s regulatory authority under subparagraph (C) is limited to 
those devices, articles, or apparel that are used for “the apparent purpose of 
safeguarding users of motor vehicles against risk of accident, injury, or death.”  
See id. (emphasis added). 
50.  49 U.S.C. §§ 30102 (a)(6), 30111. 
51.  § 30102 (a)(7)(A). 
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improvements to a motor vehicle.52   
NHTSA’s authority over these groups of items: (1) 
systems, parts, and components installed or included in a 
vehicle, (2) replacements and improvements to those systems, 
parts and components, and (3) accessories and additions to 
motor vehicles is very broad.  Their status as motor vehicle 
equipment does not depend on the type of technology or its 
mode of control (mechanical or electronic) or whether an item 
is tangible or intangible.53  Thus, the transition from 
mechanical to electromechanical systems has had no 
significant effect on the extent of NHTSA’s authority over 
motor vehicle performance.  NHTSA will continue to have 
regulatory authority over all the systems, parts and 
components installed on new motor vehicles under the Safety 
Act as motor vehicle control systems become increasingly 
electronic and then increasingly  automated.  
A. Motor Vehicles Originally Manufactured as Autonomous 
Vehicles 
This part of the definition of “motor vehicle equipment” 
includes all systems, parts, and components that are installed 
in or accompany a motor vehicle as it is originally 
manufactured.54  In essence, this authorizes the agency to 
regulate anything that is included with the motor vehicle at 
the time it is produced for sale to a member of the public.  
“System, part, or component” is broad language that 
encompasses a large universe of items that can be considered 
 
52.  § 30102 (a)(7)(B). 
53. See, e.g., Drive-by-Wire™ Throttle System, HONDA, 
http://automobiles.honda.com/crosstour/features.aspx?Feature=dbw (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012) (detailing the drive-by-wire system currently available on the 
Honda Crosstour).  An example of an electromechanical system is a drive-by-
wire system, which is currently used in various vehicle models.  Id.  It 
substitutes electronic linkages and electromechanical actuators for the 
traditional mechanical linkages between driver controls (steering wheel, brake 
pedal, and accelerator pedal) and the associated vehicle operating systems.  Id.  
Instead of the driver’s hands turning the steering wheel, which in turn could 
move a rack and pinion mechanical link to the wheels, the driver’s turning of 
the steering wheel would send an electrical command to the wheels and the 
vehicle would turn the wheels accordingly.  Id.  NHTSA would consider such a 
system, including the electrical signals used to relay commands, to be motor 
vehicle equipment. 
 54. “Motor vehicle equipment means—any system, part, or component of a 
motor vehicle as originally manufactured.”  § 30102 (a)(7)(A). 
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motor vehicle equipment.55 
The agency has already given some consideration to the 
application of subparagraph (A) of the definition of “motor 
vehicle equipment” to novel technologies.  A recent example of 
a new technology that the agency has considered to be an 
item of motor vehicle equipment is an in-vehicle 
communications system (such as OnStar).56  OnStar is 
available on many new General Motors models.  As an item 
that is usually57 installed as original equipment for the 
purposes of providing various functions, such as emergency 
notification and turn-by-turn navigation,58 the device is 
considered by the agency to be a system, part, or component 
installed in motor vehicles as originally manufactured.  As 
discussed above, sensors and other equipment that allow 
autonomous technology to function would be considered 
“motor vehicle equipment” by virtue of these items’ being 
installed in a new motor vehicle at the time of manufacture 
(in the same manner as OnStar).  
B. Aftermarket Autonomous Technologies 
The definition of “motor vehicle equipment” also gives 
great breadth to NHTSA’s authority to issue safety standards 
and the manufacturers’ obligation to recall noncompliant or 
defective equipment and devices that are not part of the 
 
 55. A system is “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items 
forming a unified whole . . . : a group of devices or artificial objects or an 
organization forming a network especially for distributing something or serving 
a common purpose.”  System, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/system (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).  A part is “one of the 
often indefinite or unequal subdivisions into which something is or is regarded 
as divided and which together constitute the whole.”  Part, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/part (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).  A 
component is “a constituent part: INGREDIENT.”  Component, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/component?show=0&t= 
1337029662 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
 56. See Letter from Anthony M. Cooke, Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Ashley G. 
Alley, Office of General Counsel, Gov’t Accountability Office (July 19, 2007), 
available at http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/GAO%20telematics%20Sept%2013 
.htm. 
 57. OnStar is currently available as an aftermarket device.  See Althea 
Chang, Aftermarket OnStar Available to Non-GM Vehicles on Sunday, 
FORBES.COM (July 23, 2011, 5:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/altheachang/ 
2011/07/23/aftermarket-onstar-available-to-non-gm-vehicles-on-sunday/. 
 58. See id. 
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vehicle as originally manufactured, but are purchased by 
motor vehicle users in the after-market.59  The agency’s 
jurisdiction over after-market equipment is significant in 
regard to autonomous driving technologies because providers 
of advanced crash avoidance and autonomous driving 
technologies might wish to market these technologies for 
installation on used vehicles.  Further, any after-market 
software updates to the autonomous driving system or 
software enabling other devices to connect to the autonomous 
driving system would be considered “motor vehicle 
equipment” under this part of the definition. 
The statutory language separates the items covered by 
this part of the definition into two groups: (1) those that are a 
“replacement or improvement” and (2) those that are an 
“accessory or addition.”  Thus, for discussion purposes, we 
have restated subparagraph (B) of the statutory definition to 
aid readers in understanding the criteria that govern the 
determination of whether an item qualifies as a “replacement 
or improvement” or as an “accessory or addition.”  As 
restated, subparagraph (B) reads: 
(B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold 
 for replacement or improvement of a system, part, 
or component, or 
 as an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle; 
The following paragraphs will discuss each of the above 
groups of items and the associated requirements from the 
statutory text.  It is important to note that, while the criteria 
for those items over which NHTSA possesses regulatory 
authority by virtue of subparagraph (B) of the definition of 
“motor vehicle equipment” are different from the criteria for 
items that fall under subparagraph (A) of the definition,60 
both subparagraph (A) and (B) begin with the same pool of 
items (system, parts, or components).61  In essence, NHTSA 
 
 59. See § 30102 (a)(7)(B) (covering replacements, improvements, accessories, 
and additions). 
 60. Part (A) restricts system, parts, and components by the time during 
which they are attached to motor vehicle.  See § 30102 (a)(7)(A).  Part (B) has 
different restrictions as will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow.  See § 
30102 (a)(7)(B). 
 61. Part (A) defines the universe of objects as “system, parts, or 
components,” while part (B) begins with “similar parts or components.”  § 30102 
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possesses regulatory authority under subparagraph (A) of the 
definition of “motor vehicle equipment” over items that are 
systems, parts, or components on new motor vehicles.62  
Subparagraph (B) of the definition of “motor vehicle 
equipment” gives NHTSA regulatory authority over the same 
or similar systems, parts, or components sold in the 
aftermarket and installed in used vehicles.63   
1. Replacements and Improvements 
An autonomous driving system would be considered 
motor vehicle equipment regardless of whether it is offered to 
consumers as original equipment on a new motor vehicle or as 
an after-market replacement of or improvement to original 
equipment.  NHTSA’s regulatory authority over items that 
are sold as “replacement[s] or improvement[s] of a system, 
part, or component” allows the agency to regulate 
autonomous technology installed as aftermarket equipment.64  
Installing autonomous technology on a vehicle that was not 
originally manufactured as an autonomous vehicle would 
necessitate extensive modification to the vehicle.65  The items 
used to convert a used vehicle to an autonomous vehicle 
would be considered improvements to a motor vehicle.66  
This part of the definition of “motor vehicle equipment” is 
also applicable to software installed on vehicles.  For 
example, a manufacturer could issue software updates for 
existing autonomous driving systems.  Regardless of where 
the software is located (i.e., on what type of hardware), the 
 
(a)(7)(A)–(B).  As most all parts of a vehicle can need replacement, it does not 
seem accurate to consider the “replacements,” “improvements,” “accessories,” or 
“additions,” in part (B) to be a narrower set of objects as in part (A).  See id. 
62. § 30102 (a)(7)(A). 
63. § 30102 (a)(7)(B). 
64. Id. 
65. See Sebastian Thrun & Chris Urmson, Keynote Presentation at IROS 
2011 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=z7ub5Doyapk (explaining how the Google self-driving car achieves 
autonomous driving).  The Google self-driving car offers an example of the 
extensive modifications that would be necessary to convert a vehicle that was 
not originally manufactured as an autonomous vehicle to one capable of 
autonomous driving.  See id. 
66. § 30102 (a)(7)(B).  It is likely that items used to convert a vehicle that 
was not originally manufactured as an autonomous vehicle to one capable of 
autonomous operation could also qualify as additions to a motor vehicle.  See id.  
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software itself would be subject to the Safety Act and could be 
subject to a safety standard should there be a sufficient safety 
need for one.  If a software update were delivered to a 
consumer (such as updated maps or enhanced decision-
making algorithms), the software itself would be considered a 
replacement or improvement under the first half of 
subparagraph (B) of the definition. 
2. Accessories and Additions 
Items that are considered “motor vehicle equipment” 
because they are accessories or additions to motor vehicles 
differ from the items we have discussed above.  Unlike items 
that are considered to be replacements or additions, items 
that are considered to be accessories or additions are not 
necessarily as closely related to the systems, parts and 
components originally installed in new motor vehicles (in the 
sense that these items potentially do not duplicate the 
functions of original equipment). 
The dictionary definition of “addition” seems to imply 
that an “addition” to the motor vehicle is an item that 
becomes united or joined with a motor vehicle.67  In other 
words, it is not an item which can be freely carried into and 
out of the vehicle. 
The dictionary definition of “accessory” states that an 
accessory is a secondary item which adds some value or 
function (such as additional convenience or effectiveness) to 
the original item.68  While such a definition does not 
contemplate that an item’s becoming a part of (or physically 
attached) to the motor vehicle in order to be regarded as an 
accessory (as such an interpretation would make “accessory” 
duplicative of the term “addition”), this definition does seem 
to imply some sort of use of the item in conjunction with the 
 
 67. An addition is “a part added (as to a building or residential section)” and 
add means “to join or unite so as to bring about an increase or improvement.”  
Addition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
addition (last visited Oct. 9, 2012); Add, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/add (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
 68. An accessory can be “a thing of secondary or subordinate importance: 
ADJUNCT” or “an object or device not essential in itself but adding to the 
beauty, convenience, or effectiveness of something else.”  Accessory, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accessory (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012). 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
1446 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
motor vehicle.  Thus, an item could be an “accessory” under 
subparagraph (B) of the statutory definition of “motor vehicle 
equipment” if a substantial portion of its expected use were in 
conjunction with motor vehicles.69   
Given that a system, part, or component might be 
intangible and electronic, and given that an item can be an 
accessory to a motor vehicle under subparagraph (B) as long 
as a substantial portion of its expected use is in conjunction 
with a motor vehicle, certain types of software can be 
regarded as an accessory and thus are “motor vehicle 
equipment.”  For example, a software application that could 
be installed on a cell phone for the purpose of enabling the 
phone user to perform such vehicle-related functions as 
starting/stopping or locking/unlocking a motor vehicle 
through manipulating the controls on the phone would be 
considered an accessory to the motor vehicle even if the cell 
phone itself is not.70  Other applications can perform 
 
69. One practical consideration in the agency’s deciding whether to exercise 
this authority with respect to a particular type of object would be whether 
another federal agency was authorized, able and inclined to regulate the safety 
of that object effectively. 
70.  Our conclusion that software can be an item of motor vehicle equipment 
is reinforced by the recent enactment of MAP-21.  In that Act, Congress 
implicitly recognized this fact when it directed NHTSA to examine the need for 
safety standards with regard to electronic systems in passenger motor vehicles.  
See Pub. L. No.112-141, §§ 31401-02, 126 Stat. 405.  Separately, NHTSA is not 
the only agency contemplating how its statutory authority may apply to 
software.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is also considering 
adopting an interpretation of its statutory authority that would subject software 
installed on mobile devices to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 301 et seq. (2006).  See Draft Guidance for Industry 
and Food and Drug Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications; 
Availability, 76 Fed. Reg. 43689 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Draft 
Guidance] (announcing the availability of the FDA’s proposed application of the 
agency’s regulatory authority to software applications installed on mobile 
devices), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/07/21/2011-
18537/draft-guidance-for-industry-and-food-and-drug-administration-staff-
mobile-medical-applications.  The FDA’s draft guidance would treat software 
installed on mobile devices as a regulated device under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 301 et seq. (2006), if the software met the 
definition of “device” contained in the Act and is either “used as an accessory to 
a regulated medical device or transforms a mobile platform into a regulated 
medical device.”  FDA Draft Guidance, supra.  The term “device” is defined in 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as: 
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, 
in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any 
component, part, or accessory, which is . . . recognized in the official 
 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
2012] POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF AMVS 1447 
functions related to on-road vehicle operation.  An example is 
a software application that uses the camera function on a 
smart phone placed on a vehicle’s dashboard to detect and 
recognize vehicles on the road ahead and provide forward 
collision warnings.  
IV. SAFETY STANDARDS: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND 
ADDRESSABLE ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE 
While NHTSA’s authority over autonomous driving 
systems is quite broad, the agency is still faced with the 
challenge of determining the appropriate instances for and 
effective ways of regulating autonomous driving technologies 
(whether functioning individually or in combination) using 
the existing statutory framework.  Under the Safety Act, 
NHTSA’s standards must be performance-oriented.71  
Further, the standards are required to be practicable, 
objective, and meet the need for safety.72  This section does 
not attempt a comprehensive identification and resolution of 
the possible regulatory issues that can arise with the advent 
of increasingly complex autonomous driving technologies.  
Instead, it attempts to illustrate possible regulatory 
challenges and their solutions by first providing an overview 
of the current statutory framework for establishing standards 
and then applying that framework to a few technical areas 
 
National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or any 
supplement to them, [] intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or 
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease, in man or other animals, or [] intended to affect the structure 
or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does 
not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action 
within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not 
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary 
intended purpose. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006).   
 71. See 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8) (defining “motor vehicle safety” as “the 
performance of a motor vehicle . . . in a way that protects the public against 
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or 
performance of a motor vehicle”); see § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle 
safety standard” as “a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment performance.”  See S. REP. NO. 89-1301, at 2713–14 (1966) (stating 
that motor vehicle standards issued by NHTSA should specify a minimum level 
of safety performance). 
 72. See 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (establishing requirements for NHTSA to 
follow when issuing motor vehicle safety standards). 
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with foreseeable regulatory issues.  The technical areas 
examined in this section include the following: 
 Minimum Standards and Testing for Software 
Performance: As vehicle systems employ artificial 
intelligence to accomplish multiple (or all) driving 
tasks, how can the agency help to ensure that the 
autonomous driving systems accomplish their tasks in 
a reliable, accurate, and timely fashion? 
 Security and Privacy of Vehicle Systems: Public 
acceptance and activation of autonomous driving 
technologies will depend substantially on the ability of 
those technologies to perform reliably and safely and 
without compromising the privacy of drivers.  As 
autonomous driving systems will be increasingly 
integrated with other devices through wireless 
interfaces, how can the agency help to protect vehicle 
systems from malicious hacking and tampering?  In 
addition, how can it help protect the information 
received, generated and sent by autonomous vehicles 
and ensure that drivers may freely move without being 
tracked? 
 User Interfaces with Autonomous Driving Systems: As 
some vehicle systems might become automated before 
others, some communication between the vehicle and 
the driver about those automated systems would be 
necessary.  How can the agency help to ensure that the 
driver has a proper understanding of whether the 
vehicle is responsible or whether the driver is 
responsible for any given driving task at any given 
moment? 
With these questions in mind, this section attempts to 
illustrate the challenges confronting NHTSA in addressing 
these safety issues using performance standards that are 
both objective and practicable.  During the course of this 
analysis, we conclude that (although additional research 
might be required) many of NHTSA’s current approaches to 
writing performance requirements and test procedures that 
address real world scenarios can be effectively applied to 
autonomous driving technologies.  Further, we note that 
connected vehicles and autonomous motor vehicles are 
closely-related (but distinct) concepts, and thus many of the 
challenges in regulating autonomous motor vehicles and 
connected motor vehicles are quite similar. 
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A. Requirements and Considerations Applicable to Safety 
Standards 
1. Performance-Oriented 
NHTSA’s regulatory authority would allow the agency to 
issue safety standards that regulate the performance of 
autonomous vehicles.  While NHTSA is directed to establish 
performance standards, the case law and the legislative 
history indicate that when necessary to promote safety, 
NHTSA can be quite specific in drafting its performance 
standards and may require or preclude the installation of 
certain equipment.  In the Safety Act, the Secretary is 
directed to issue motor vehicle safety standards.  “Motor 
vehicle safety standards” are defined as “minimum 
standard[s] for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment 
performance.”73  The cases have reinforced this concept by 
determining that NHTSA is “generally charged”74 with 
setting performance standards, instead of becoming directly 
involved in questions of design.75  The legislative history 
further illustrates that NHTSA’s standards are to “[specify] 
the required minimum safe performance of vehicles but not 
the manner in which the manufacturer is to achieve the 
specified performance.” 76  An example cited in the legislative 
history points to “a building code which specifies the 
minimum load-carrying characteristics of the structural 
members of a building wall, but leaves the builder free to 
choose his own materials and design.”77 
Although the Safety Act directs NHTSA to issue 
performance standards, Congress understood that the agency 
may preclude certain designs through these performance 
standards.  “Motor vehicle safety,” is defined in the Safety Act 
as the performance of a motor vehicle in a way that protects 
the public from unreasonable risks of accident due to (among 
other things) the design of the motor vehicle.78  The legislative 
 
 73. Id.; see also § 30102 (a)(9) (emphasis added).   
 74. Washington v. Dept. of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
 75. Id. at 1224 (citations omitted). 
 76. S. REP. NO. 89-1301, at 2713–14 (1966). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See § 30102(a)(8) (“ ‘ Motor vehicle safety’ means the performance of a 
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public 
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history is clear that this language is not intended to afford 
the agency the authority to promulgate design standards, 
“but merely to clarify that the public is to be protected from 
inherently dangerous designs which conflict with the concept 
of motor vehicle safety.”79  This clarification is evidence that 
Congress recognized that performance standards inevitably 
have an impact on the design of a motor vehicle.80 
The courts have further elaborated on the framework 
established by Congress and have recognized that, when 
necessary to achieve a safety purpose, NHTSA can be quite 
specific in establishing performance standards even if certain 
designs will be precluded.  For example, the Sixth Circuit 
found that an agency provision permitting rectangular 
headlamps, but only if they were of certain specified 
dimensions, was not an invalid design restriction and 
“serve[d] to ensure proper headlamp performance,” reasoning 
that “the overall safety and reliability of a headlamp system 
depends to a certain extent upon the wide availability of 
replacement lamps, which in turn depends upon 
standardization.”81  Thus, the court found it permissible for 
the agency to establish very specific requirements for 
headlamps even though it would restrict design flexibility.82 
Further, the cases indicate that NHTSA can establish 
standards to require the installation of certain specific 
equipment on vehicles and establish performance standards 
for that equipment.  For example, the Tenth Circuit found in 
Washington v. DOT that “NHTSA’s regulatory authority 
extends beyond the performance of motor vehicles per se, to 
particular items of equipment.”83  In that case, the validity of 
NHTSA’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 
 
against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, 
construction, or performance of a motor vehicle.”). 
 79. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1919, at 2732 (1966). 
 80. Courts have also recognized this truth.  See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of 
Transp., 515 F.2d 1053, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Washington, 84 F.3d 
at 1224 (stating “the performance-design distinction is much easier to state in 
the abstract than to apply definitively-so . . . . This is particularly true when, 
due to contingent relationships between performance requirements and design 
options, specification of the former effectively entails, or severely constrains, the 
latter.”). 
 81. Chrysler Corp., 515 F.2d at 1058–59. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Washington, 84 F.3d at 1222, 1225 (citations omitted). 
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No. 121 requiring ABS systems on air-braked vehicles was 
challenged as “imposing design specifications rather than 
performance criteria.”84  The court’s conclusion was based not 
only on the fact that prior courts had upheld NHTSA’s 
standards requiring particular equipment,85 but also on the 
fact that Congress had recognized NHTSA’s former 
rulemakings and left NHTSA’s authority unchanged when it 
codified the Safety Act in 1994.86 
Thus, in summary, NHTSA is required to issue 
performance standards when regulating motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle equipment.  However, NHTSA is able to be 
quite specific in establishing performance standards and may 
preclude certain designs that are contrary to the interests of 
safety.  Further, NHTSA may require the installation of 
certain equipment and establish performance standards for 
that equipment. 
2. Meeting the Need for Safety 
As required by the Safety Act, standards issued by the 
agency must “meet the need for motor vehicle safety.”87  As 
“motor vehicle safety” is defined in the statute as protecting 
the public against “unreasonable risk” of accidents, death, or 
injury,88 the case law indicates that there must be a nexus 
between the safety problem and the standard.89  However, a 
 
 84. Id. at 1223. 
 85. See id. at 1225 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 3222, 
3222 n.4) (1st Cir. 1969) (“motor vehicles are required to have specific items of 
equipment . . . these enumerated items of equipment are subject to specific 
performance standards,” including lamps and reflective devices requiring 
“specific items of equipment”); Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 417 
(1st Cir. 1988) (“requiring seat belts or passive restraints . . . has elements of a 
design standard”); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 
332 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“factory equipped . . . head restraints which meet specific 
federal standards”). 
 86. See Washington, 84 F.3d at 1225. 
 87. See 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a). 
 88. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 89. See, e.g., National Tire Dealers Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 35–37 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that the administrative record did not support a 
significant nexus between motor vehicle safety and requiring retread tires to 
have permanent labels because there was no showing that a second-hand owner 
would be dependent on these labels and no showing as to how often such 
situations would arise); see also H&H Tire Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 471 F.2d 350, 
354–55 (7th Cir. 1972) (expressing doubt that the standard met the need for 
safety because there was little evidence that the required compliance tests 
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standard need not address safety by direct means.   
In upholding NHTSA’s authority to issue a safety 
standard requiring standardized vehicle identification 
numbers (VINs), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that a FMVSS requiring VINs met the need for motor vehicle 
safety by such indirect means as reducing errors in compiling 
statistical data on motor vehicle crashes (in order to aid 
research to understand current safety problems and support 
future standards, to increase the efficiency of vehicle recall 
campaigns, and to assist in tracing stolen vehicles).90 
3. Objective 
A standard is objective if it specifies test procedures that 
are “capable of producing identical results when test 
conditions are exactly duplicated” and performance 
requirements whose satisfaction is “based upon the readings 
obtained from measuring instruments as opposed to the 
subjective opinions.”91  The requirement that standards be 
stated in objective terms matches the overall statutory 
scheme requiring that manufacturers self-certify that their 
motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment are in compliance 
with the relevant FMVSSs.92  In order for this statutory 
scheme to work, the agency and the manufacturer must be 
able to obtain the same result from identical tests in order to 
objectively determine the validity of the manufacturer’s 
certification.93 
Using those two elements of objectivity (capable of 
producing identical results and compliance based on 
measurements not subjective opinion), the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the test procedure in question in 
early version of FMVSS No. 208 was not objective because the 
test dummy specified in the standard for use in compliance 
 
would ensure that retreaded tires would be capable of performing safely under 
modern driving conditions). 
 90. See Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm’n v. NHTSA, 611 F. 2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 
1979). 
 91. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 676.  See also 
Paccar, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632, 644 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
 92. See 49 U.S.C. § 30115(a) (2006).   
 93. See Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d at 675. 
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testing did not give consistent and repeatable results.94  The 
court in this case was unconvinced that the standard met the 
objectivity requirements even though NHTSA based its test 
procedure on a test dummy in a voluntary automotive 
industry standard (Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
Recommended Practice J963).  The court rejected NHTSA’s 
explanation that, although J963 “may not provide totally 
reproducible results,”95 “dummies conforming to the SAE 
specifications are the most complete and satisfactory ones 
presently available.”96  Further, the court rejected NHTSA’s 
reasoning that, in the event that the agency’s test results 
were different from those of the manufacturers because of the 
difference in the test dummies, NHTSA’s test results would 
not be used to find non-compliance,97 stating that “there is no 
room for an [ ] agency investigation [ ] in this procedure” that 
enable the agency to compare results of differing tests.98 
Other courts have also reached similar conclusions.  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the same 
reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit, found that a 
compliance road test specifying the use of surfaces specifically 
rated with quantifiable numbers (defining the “slickness” of 
the surfaces) was objective despite “[t]he fact that it is 
difficult to create and thereafter maintain a road surface with 
a particular coefficient of friction does not render the specified 
 
 94. The court stated,  
The record supports the conclusions that the test procedures and the 
test device specified . . . are not objective in at least the following 
respects: (1) The absence of an adequate flexibility criteria for the 
dummy’s neck; the existing specifications permit the neck to be very 
stiff, or very flexible, or somewhere in between, significantly affecting 
the resultant forces measured on the dummy’s head.  (2) Permissible 
variations in the test procedure for determining thorax dynamic spring 
rate (force deflection characteristics on the dummy’s chest) permit 
considerable latitude in chest construction which could produce wide 
variations in maximum chest deceleration between two different 
dummies, each of which meets the literal requirements of SAE J963.  
(3) The absence of specific, objective specifications for construction of 
the dummy’s head permits significant variation in forces imparted to 
the accelerometer by which performance is to be measured.  
See id. at 676–78. 
 95. See id. at 677. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. at 677–78. 
 98. Id. at 678–79. 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
1454 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
coefficient any less objective.”99  In this case, both NHTSA 
and the manufacturer would perform road tests on surfaces 
with identically rated friction coefficients.100  In a later case, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld NHTSA’s decision not to incorporate 
a test suggested by a commenter for wheelchair 
crashworthiness performed with a “test seat” which “shall be 
capable of resisting significant deformation during a test” as 
not sufficiently objective.101  In the absence of language 
quantifying how much deformation is significant, terms such 
as “significant deformation” do not provide enough specificity 
to remove the subjective element from the compliance 
determination process. 
4. Practicable 
In general, the practicability of a given standard involves 
a number of considerations.  The majority of issues 
concerning the practicability of a standard arise out of 
whether the standard is technologically and economically 
feasible.  An additional issue is whether the means used by 
manufacturers to comply with a standard will be accepted 
and correctly used by the public. 
i. Technological Practicability 
Significant technical uncertainties in meeting a standard 
might lead a court to find that a standard is not practicable.  
For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
NHTSA’s decision to amend FMVSS No. 222 to include 
requirements for wheelchair securement and occupant 
restraint on school buses with a static102 compliance test 
instead of a dynamic test,103 noting that the administrative 
 
 99. See Paccar, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632, 
644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). 
 100. See id. (stating that the “skid number method of testing braking 
capacity meets the [objectivity] definition.  Identical results will ensue when 
test conditions are exactly duplicated.  The procedure is rational and decisively 
demonstrable.  Compliance is based on objective measures of stopping distances 
rather than on the subjective opinions of human beings.”). 
 101. Simms v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 45 F.3d 999, 1007–08 
(6th Cir. 1995). 
 102. Static testing tests the strength of individual components of the 
wheelchair separately, while dynamic testing subjects the entire wheelchair to 
simulated real-world crash conditions.  See Simms, 45 F.3d at 1001. 
 103. See id. at 1006–08.  Petitioners argued that NHTSA had acted 
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record showed that this particular dynamic test was 
underdeveloped and had many unresolved technical 
problems.104  The court noted that it is not practicable “[t]o 
attempt to fashion rules in an area in which many technical 
problems have been identified and no consensus exists for 
their resolution . . . .”105  In another example, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found a compliance test procedure 
using a specified friction (“slickness”) coefficient to be 
impracticable due to technical difficulties in maintaining the 
specific slickness test condition.  As mentioned above, the 
Ninth Circuit found the specified coefficient test condition to 
be objective.106  However, the court found that this standard 
was not practicable due to the technical difficulties in 
maintaining this specific test condition.  Thus, the cases show 
that when significant technical uncertainties and difficulties 
exist in a standard promulgated by NHTSA, those portions of 
the standard can be considered impracticable under the 
Safety Act. 
However, the requirement that standards be 
technologically feasible does not require that the technology 
to be used to comply with a new standard be fully developed 
and tested when the standard is promulgated.  The Sixth 
 
unlawfully in promulgating standards for the securement of wheelchairs on 
school buses based only on “static” instead of “dynamic” testing.  Id.  Static 
testing tests the strength of the individual components of a securement device.  
See id.  Dynamic testing is a full systems approach that measures the forces 
experienced by a human surrogate (test dummy) in simulated crash that 
replicates real world conditions and assesses the combined performance of the 
vehicle and the securement device.  See id. 
 104. Id. at 1005–07.  NHTSA agreed that dynamic testing is the preferred 
approach (because it more fully and accurately replicates the real world 
conditions in which the desired safety performance is to be provided), but 
explained that it was not practicable at that time to adopt dynamic testing 
because there was:  
(1) [N]eed to develop an appropriate test dummy; (2) need to identify 
human tolerance levels for a handicapped child; (3) need to establish 
test conditions; (4) need to select a “standard” or surrogate wheelchair; 
(5) need to establish procedures for placing the wheelchair and test 
dummy in an effective test condition; and (6) need to develop an 
appropriate test buck to represent a portion of the school bus body for 
securement and anchorages.   
Id. at 1005. 
 105. Id. at 1010–11. 
 106. Paccar, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632, 644 
(9th Cir. 1978). 
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Circuit upheld a NHTSA standard requiring “Complete 
Passive Protection,” that includes the required use of airbags 
as standard equipment, by a future date, rejecting petitioner’s 
contention that standards cannot require nonexistent 
technology.107  Relying on the legislative history of the Safety 
Act, the court found that the agency “is empowered to issue 
safety standards which require improvements in existing 
technology or which require the development of new 
technology, and is not limited to issuing standards based fully 
on devices already fully developed.”108  Thus, while 
technological feasibility is a significant part of determining 
whether a given standard can be considered practicable, the 
agency is fully empowered to issue technology-driving 
standards when it is appropriate to do so. 
ii. Economic Practicability 
A standard can be considered impracticable by the courts 
due to economic infeasibility.  This consideration primarily 
involves the costs imposed by a standard.109  In the instances 
in which a court has been called upon to assess whether a 
standard is economically feasible, typically with respect to an 
industry composed largely of relatively small businesses, the 
courts have asked whether or not the cost would be so 
 
 107. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 666, 671–75 (6th 
Cir. 1972).  Stages one and two required vehicle manufactures to provide 
“Complete Passive Protection,” or one of two other options on vehicles 
manufactured between January 1, 1972, and August 14, 1973, for stage one, 
and after August 15, 1972, stage two.  See id. at 666–67.  Stage 3, requiring 
solely “Complete Passive Protection” was required by August 15, 1975.  Id. at 
667. 
 108. Id. at 673.  In making its decision, the court stated  
[I]t is clear from the Act and its legislative history that the Agency may 
issue standards requiring future levels of motor vehicle performance 
which manufacturers could not meet unless they diverted more of their 
resources to producing additional safety technology than they might 
otherwise do.  This distinction is one committed to the Agency’s 
discretion, and any hardships which might result from the adoption of 
a standard requiring . . . a great degree of developmental research, can 
be ameliorated by the Agency under . . . .  The section [that] allows the 
Secretary to extend the effective date beyond the usual statutory 
maximum of one year from the date of issuance, as he has done [here].   
Id. at 673. 
 109. See, e.g., Nat’l Truck Equip. Ass’n v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., 919 F.2d 1148, 1153–54 (6th Cir. 1990); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 
751 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (panel opinion by Circuit Judge Scalia). 
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prohibitive that it could cause significant harm to a well-
established industry.  In essence, this consideration generally 
establishes a non-quantified outer limit of the costs that can 
be reasonably imposed upon regulated entities.  If compliance 
with the standard is so burdensome, i.e., costly, so as to 
create a significant harm to a well-established industry, 
courts have generally found that the standard is 
impracticable in its application to that industry. 
iii. Public Acceptance and Use 
Finally, a standard might not be considered practicable if 
the public were not expected to accept and correctly use the 
technologies installed in compliance with the standard.  
When considering passive restraints such as automatic 
seatbelts, the D.C. Circuit stated that “the agency cannot 
fulfill its statutory responsibility [in regard to practicability] 
unless it considers popular reaction.”110  While the agency 
argued in that case that public acceptance is not one of the 
statutory criteria that the agency must apply, the court 
disagreed.111  The court reasoned that, “without public 
cooperation there can be no assurance that a safety system 
can ‘meet the need for motor vehicle safety.’ ” 112  Thus, as a 
part of the agency’s considerations, a standard issued by the 
agency will not be considered practicable if the technologies 
installed pursuant to the standard are so unpopular that 
there is no assurance of sufficient public cooperation to meet 
the safety need that the standard seeks to address.113 
B. Autonomous Performance: Minimum Standards and 
Methods of Ensuring Compliance 
As we have mentioned above, autonomous driving 
systems can employ a variety of hardware (such as 
sensors/cameras/communications devices) and complex 
 
 110. See Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345–46 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Pursuant to concerns about public acceptance of various seat belt 
designs, NHTSA issued a final rule in 1981 adding seat belt comfort and 
convenience requirements to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.  
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Improvement of Seat Belt Assemblies, 
46 Fed. Reg. 2064 (Jan. 8, 1981) (codified at 49 C.F.R. 571). 
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software—capable of assisting or even replacing the driver’s 
senses and intelligence—for an increasing number of driving 
tasks.  Today, vehicles are already beginning to incorporate 
software designed to issue warnings to the driver regarding 
conditions (e.g., potential crashes with other vehicles) in the 
immediate surrounding area or even automatically brake the 
vehicle on behalf of the driver to avoid or at least mitigate 
potential crashes.114  NHTSA will need to develop methods of 
ensuring a minimum level of safety performance, as it does 
for more traditional automotive technologies, if it determines 
that any of these technologies lead to a significant safety 
benefit or have potential to create safety issues. 
This task will become increasingly complex as 
autonomous driving systems are designed for the potentially 
limitless variety of real-world stimuli, conditions, and 
scenarios.  In response to these factors, a vehicle’s sensors 
must acquire the appropriate information, its software must 
intelligently interpret this information, and the vehicle must 
take the appropriate and timely actions.  In response to 
general concerns about increasingly capable and complex 
electronic systems, NHTSA arranged for the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study and make 
recommendations for addressing the challenges posed by 
those systems.  NAS’s report recommends that NHTSA 
become more familiar with and proactive in responding to 
those complex challenges.115  The report highlights many of 
the same challenges in regulating electronic control systems 
discussed in this Article.116  The report also contains several 
 
 114. See, e.g., Reward 2010 - Mercedes-Benz PRE-SAFE Brake, EURO NCAP, 
http://www.euroncap.com/rewards/mercedes_benz_pre_safe_brake.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing briefly the Mercedes-Benz PRE-SAFE system—
available on the E-Class—as a system which issues warnings and is able to 
brake autonomously in certain situations). 
 115. See Press Release, Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Unintended Acceleration 
Controversy Reveals Need for NHTSA to Anticipate Safety Challenges From 
Automotive Electronics, Says New Report (Jan. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13342. 
 116. See generally TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., THE SAFETY PROMISES AND 
CHALLENGES OF AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS: INSIGHTS FROM UNINTENDED 
ACCELERATION 117–34 (2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog.php?record_id=13342 (describing the extent to which electronic control 
systems are incorporated into new vehicles and recommending strategies to 
improve the safety of electronic systems in motor vehicles).  The Transportation 
Research Board is an affiliate of the National Academy of Sciences.  Id. at iii. 
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recommendations to NHTSA regarding the agency’s efforts to 
ensure the safety of electronic control systems.117  NHTSA is 
reviewing these recommendations and will consider how 
adopting the recommendations could improve the way in 
which NHTSA seeks to ensure the safety of these systems.118  
While NHTSA will seek to conduct additional research in the 
area of electronics, many of the methods NHTSA currently 
uses to help to ensure that its standards adequately promote 
safety under real world conditions will still be applicable to 
these technologies.119 
1. Technical Issue: Ensuring that Autonomous Motor 
Vehicles Can Handle a Broad Array of Real-
World Driving Conditions 
In earlier sections of this Article, we discussed the idea of 
a continuum of autonomous driving technologies.  We 
recognized in that section that the implementation of 
autonomous driving technologies will likely be implemented 
in stages, thus allowing the vehicle to assume progressively 
more driving tasks over time.  With warning systems and 
other advanced crash avoidance technologies (such as forward 
collision warning and automatic emergency braking), the 
vehicle software is performing relatively simple functions 
because it has comparatively less responsibility.  For 
example, with a crash imminent braking or a forward 
collision warning system, the vehicle software is only 
required to detect the vehicle in front and warn the driver (or 
intervene with braking) when the distance to the forward 
vehicle decreases at a rate greater than a certain threshold, 
indicating that a collision is likely. 
 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., NHTSA Statement 
on NAS Report on Electronic Control Systems (Jan. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2012/NHTSA+Statement+
on+NAS+Report+on+Electronic+Control+Systems. 
 119. Several of the recommendations contained in National Academy of 
Science report on electronic control systems pertained to increasing NHTSA’s 
familiarity with manufacturers’ quality assurance processes and technical 
expertise in automotive electronics.  See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 
116, at 117–34 (recommending strategies for NHTSA to regulate the safety of 
electronic control systems). 
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These calculations are relatively simple and made under 
controlled circumstances.  While it is never completely 
straightforward to construct an objective and practicable 
standard which adequately anticipates and incorporates the 
appropriate test variables, one can imagine a standard that 
requires manufacturers to certify that their vehicles have 
collision braking when tested under controlled conditions on a 
test track.  Such a test procedure could require, for example, 
that when a vehicle is proceeding at 50 mph on a straight test 
track and encounters a 40 mph lead vehicle in the same lane 
on the test track, it automatically reduces its speed to match 
that of the 40 mph lead vehicle.  Additional test scenarios 
might also be specified to help to ensure that the vehicle can 
adequately respond under various emergency braking 
situations.  One scenario might, for example, utilize a 
completely stationary lead vehicle in the same lane.  Another 
scenario might utilize a vehicle rapidly decelerating from fifty 
mph to zero mph.  The test conditions under each of these 
scenarios would need to be defined in great detail in order to 
help to ensure that the results are consistent when the test 
conditions are duplicated. 
Collision imminent braking and forward collision 
warning are merely one small set of functions that contribute 
toward achieving a motor vehicle with full automation.  In 
order to ensure that a motor vehicle with full automation 
provides an appropriate level of minimum performance, the 
agency’s test or tests might need to evaluate the vehicle’s 
software decision-making in many different potential crash 
scenarios. 
2. Potential Solution: Supplementing Track Tests with 
Diagnostic Tools to Evaluate Vehicles in a Wide 
Range of Scenarios 
One potential solution for ensuring that NHTSA’s 
performance standards adequately address the ability of the 
increasingly autonomous motor vehicle to make correct 
decisions and perform reliably when assuming a substantial 
number of driving responsibilities is to utilize multiple tests 
that make use of the agency’s ability to use ranges of values, 
representative test conditions, and test devices.  As 
previously discussed, the Safety Act requires standards to be 
stated in objective terms and case law indicates that this 
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means a standard which is capable of producing identical 
results when the test conditions are exactly duplicated and is 
based upon readings obtained by measuring instruments.120  
In accomplishing these goals and the goals of addressing the 
safety need while ensuring practicability of the standard, 
NHTSA has often utilized ranges, selected representative test 
conditions, or utilized specific test devices. 
NHTSA often utilizes a range of possible test values in 
order to ensure that a standard is not only stated objectively, 
but also practicable and addresses the safety need.  In such 
situations, the agency has indicated in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) that these are the set of possible values or 
conditions that the agency may test at and that the 
manufacturer must certify that its vehicle will meet the 
requirements in the standard when tested to any of those test 
conditions within the specified range.121  For example, in 
FMVSS No. 208, entitled “Occupant Crash Protection,” 
vehicles are crashed into a barrier at any speed up to 35 
mph.122  The agency specified a range of speed conditions to 
help to ensure that protection is provided for a wide range of 
crash severity levels. 
Similarly, a range of test conditions could be utilized in 
order to ensure that the autonomous motor vehicle can 
handle multiple conditions.  For example, if NHTSA was to 
test an autonomous motor vehicle’s ability to accurately avoid 
pedestrians at an intersection, the agency could define a test 
intersection (e.g., four way intersection controlled by traffic 
light) and present the vehicle with various test objects 
defined so as to replicate the appearance of a pedestrian to 
the vehicle’s sensors.  In such a test, ranges of values could be 
utilized to make the test more representative of the possibly 
erratic trajectory of a pedestrian.  For example, the standard 
could establish that the pedestrian test object could begin at 
any point within a defined area in the intersection and 
proceed at any vector at any speed up to 10 mph.  Such a 
 
 120. Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 675 (6th Cir. 1972). 
 121. See Explanation of Usage 49 C.F.R. § 571.4 (2011) (explaining that the 
use of the word “any,” in connection with a range of values or set of items means 
that any one of those values within the specified range may be selected for 
testing). 
 122. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, para. S5.1.1(b)(2) (2011). 
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range of conditions would help to ensure that the vehicle 
would adequately detect and avoid any potential pedestrians 
within a defined range of possibilities. 
In addition, the agency utilizes representative test 
conditions in order to ensure that the test is not only 
rationally linked to the safety need, but also objective and 
repeatable.  In these instances, the test does not attempt to 
evaluate the vehicle’s performance under all possible 
conditions that might occur in the real world.  Instead, these 
tests establish conditions such that it is rational to conclude 
that if vehicles are able to meet the requirements of the 
standard when subjected to the test procedures and 
conditions specified in the standard, the vehicles will perform 
well in the vast majority of real world conditions they can be 
expected to encounter.  One example of the agency’s utilizing 
this method is in FMVSS No. 220, “School Bus Rollover 
Protection.”  In this standard, the agency’s test specifies using 
a flat plate to apply a uniformly distributed force to the school 
bus roof.123  This direct and top-down roof crush test condition 
arguably does not correspond exactly to the actual conditions 
that a school bus will be exposed to when it is involved in a 
rollover crash because most rollovers do not involve the 
application of a force directly perpendicular to the vehicle 
chassis.  However, as the excellent safety record of school 
buses demonstrates, the representative test condition used in 
FMVSS No. 220 does enable school buses to withstand 
rollover crash forces better in the real world.124 
Similarly, a representative test condition (or set of 
representative test conditions) could be utilized to assess an 
autonomous vehicle’s performance under the vast majority of 
likely crash scenarios.  Using the forward collision 
warning/collision imminent braking example from earlier in 
this section, the agency could utilize a set of representative 
conditions (such as matching the speed of a lead vehicle 
traveling at 40 mph, a stopped lead vehicle, and a rapidly 
decelerating lead vehicle) in order to ensure that the test 
 
 123. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.220 para. S5. 
 124. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Denial of Petition for 
Rulemaking; School Buses, 76 Fed. Reg. 53102, 53104 (Aug. 25, 2011) 
(discussing that school bus passengers are generally less likely to be fatally 
injured in a crash). 
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vehicle can adequately respond in the various possible real 
world forward collision scenarios.  Although NHTSA might be 
unable to test the vehicle’s forward collision avoidance 
capabilities under all possible forward collision scenarios, 
NHTSA might be able to establish a set of test conditions 
such that it would be rational to conclude that because a 
vehicle can adequately handle the defined test conditions, it 
should be able to handle the vast majority of likely real world 
conditions. 
Using the same logic, NHTSA might be able to ensure 
adequate minimum electronic systems performance of 
autonomous motor vehicles by establishing various tests 
designed to ensure the minimum performance of 
representative safety features.  As mentioned earlier in this 
Article, an autonomous motor vehicle is a vehicle which 
integrates the functionality of many different autonomous 
driving technologies.  For example, an autonomous motor 
vehicle would likely need to incorporate the functions of a 
forward collision warning/collision imminent braking system 
and the pedestrian avoidance system described above.  While 
the agency might be unable to practicably test a given 
autonomous motor vehicle model’s ability to appropriately 
react to the full gamut of possible crash scenarios, the agency 
would likely still be able to ensure that—whatever 
autonomous driving system is used by the manufacturer—the 
vehicle is able to appropriately react to a defined set of crash 
scenarios (such as pedestrian avoidance and forward collision 
avoidance). 
NHTSA would also be able to test the performance of 
software and electronic control systems by requiring the use 
of a specific test device in the agency’s compliance test.  
NHTSA often utilizes test devices in order to determine 
compliance with FMVSSs.  For example, FMVSS No. 208, 
“Occupant Crash Protection,” utilizes specified 
anthropomorphic test dummies in evaluating compliance with 
the agency’s airbag and crashworthiness requirements.125  
The CFR contains a detailed description of the test dummies 
and other similar devices that are used to measure the 
amount of crash force that would be exposed to a person in a 
 
 125. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §. 571.208, paras. S5.1.1(b), S6, S14.5. 
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crash.126  Further, FMVSS No. 208 contains specific injury 
criteria which establish the permissible amount of crash force 
that can be exposed to the test dummy’s head, neck, chest, 
etc.127  Using the test procedure defining the crash conditions 
in conjunction with the aforementioned test dummies, the 
agency can establish an objective minimum performance 
requirement on the necessary level of protection for a vehicle 
occupant during a crash. 
In a similar fashion, test devices can be utilized for 
ensuring a minimum level of software and electronic systems 
performance.  As we noted in earlier sections of this Article, 
NHTSA’s authority extends to motor vehicle equipment, 
regardless of whether it is a physical/mechanical item, or an 
intangible piece of software.  Similarly, test devices in the 
future might include software programs designed to expose 
the faults in logic or coding of software used in vehicles.  
When NHTSA enlisted NASA’s assistance in investigating 
possible software or electronic issues that might lead to 
unintended acceleration in a vehicle, NASA utilized various 
source code analysis software designed to detect coding errors 
and logic model checking.128  In a similar fashion, one can 
imagine a standard in which a specific diagnostic (simulation) 
software (or set of diagnostic software) capable of producing 
objective results is specified in the regulatory text for use in 
evaluating the quality of the source code or logic processing of 
a software component of a motor vehicle.  While the analysis 
conducted by NASA for the unintended acceleration 
investigation was very extensive, a simplified and less 
extensive version might be possible as part of a standard for 
electronic systems.  Using a software diagnostic tool is 
analogous to NHTSA’s current practice of using physical test 
devices such as anthropomorphic test dummies to determine 
compliance with a safety standard. 
 
 126. See Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 49 C.F.R. pt. 572 (describing in 
detail the various test devices that are used by the agency). 
 127. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, para. S6. 
 128. See NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., TI-10-00618, TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 
REPORT: NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. TOYOTA UNINTENDED 
ACCELERATION INVESTIGATION - APPENDIX A, available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NASA_FR_Appendix_A_Software.pdf 
(stating that NASA used Coverity, CodeSonar, and Uno to check for coding 
errors and Spin and Swarm to check the logic model). 
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As using diagnostic software only tests the coding and 
logic of the vehicle’s software component, it does not enable a 
regulatory agency to test many other aspects of the 
performance that would be critical in autonomous driving 
systems.  While using diagnostic software would enable 
NHTSA to determine if the software will make the correct 
decisions given a certain set of input data, additional testing 
would be required to ensure that a vehicle’s sensors are 
providing accurate information about the surrounding 
environment so that the vehicle can effectively execute the 
software’s commands.  Thus, utilizing diagnostic software 
tests in conjunction with other tests utilizing ranges of values 
and representative tests conditions (as described above) 
might afford more comprehensive protection.  Defining a set 
of tests as described above can enable the agency to ensure 
objective and practicable standards.  By utilizing the ability 
to define ranges of values, sets of representative test 
conditions, and test devices, the agency should be able to 
ensure a minimum level of electronic systems performance in 
a sufficient number of crash scenarios so as to rationally 
conclude that the tested vehicles will be able to appropriately 
react to the majority of likely crash scenarios. 
C. Vehicle Computer System Security and Privacy—Their 
Impact on Safety Effectiveness and/or Public Acceptance 
The increased prevalence of electronic components in 
vehicles leads to unique challenges regarding the security of 
vehicle systems.  Not only are electronic systems being 
developed that can assist (or replace) the driver’s senses and 
decision-making functions, electronic systems are already 
being used to replace traditionally mechanical components of 
the vehicle.129  This increased permeation of electronic 
components into the motor vehicle could expose the vehicle to 
new safety issues if persons can gain access to these 
electronic components and can manipulate how these 
components issue commands or otherwise interact with the 
vehicle.  Through the increased use of wireless connections 
(whether as a medium for V2V safety communications or for 
other, non-safety related purposes), it is well demonstrated 
 
 129. See, e.g., Drive-by-Wire™ Throttle System, supra note 53. 
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that it is possible to obtain unauthorized access to a vehicle’s 
systems without physical access to the vehicle.130  As 
autonomous driving systems assume more and more driving 
tasks, there is an increasing potential for a person with 
unauthorized access to create significant safety issues.  
Further, these risks are aggravated by the increasingly 
connected nature of these vehicles because increased 
connectivity (especially wireless) exposes vehicles to more 
sources of potential bad actors. 
If electronic and autonomous vehicle control systems are 
vulnerable to unauthorized access, the safety effectiveness of 
autonomous vehicle systems would suffer.  This loss of 
effectiveness would reduce public confidence in and use of 
those systems, leading to still further loss of safety benefits.  
We have noted in this Article that public acceptance is an 
important aspect to be considered when evaluating the 
practicability (and effectiveness) of a safety standard.131  
Making autonomous driving systems secure from 
unauthorized intrusion and modification would be an 
important element of a comprehensive effort to instill trust in 
the public regarding those technologies.  Further, seeking to 
 
 130. Researchers from USC and Rutgers were able to obtain unauthorized 
access to a vehicle’s systems through the wireless tire pressure monitoring 
systems.  See Peter Bright, Cars Hacked Through Wireless Tire Sensors, ARS 
TECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/news/ 
2010/08/cars-hacked-through-wireless-tyre-sensors.ars.  This wireless intrusion 
into the vehicle followed another demonstration in which researchers were able 
to disable the brakes and the engine of a vehicle through physically accessing 
the OBD-II diagnostic port.  See Robert McMillan, Car Hackers Can Kill Brakes, 
Engine, and More, PC WORLD (May 13, 2010, 11:20 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/196293/car_hackers_can_kill_br
akes_engine_and_more.html). 
 131. See Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345–46 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).  In addition to including cyber security 
requirements in a standard to ensure that a particular standard is practicable, 
NHTSA would also be able to issue cyber security standards on an independent 
basis.  See Clifton v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1312 (1st Cir. 1997).  
This is consistent with the principle of administrative law that agencies are 
authorized to promulgate rules reasonably related to achieving the purpose of 
the statute granting the rulemaking authority.  Id.  Because standards aimed at 
enhancing the security of electronic systems on motor vehicles would maintain 
the level of effectiveness of the safety features controlled by those electronic 
systems, NHTSA would be authorized able to promulgate such standards 
because they would be reasonably related to promoting motor vehicle safety.  
See id.   
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ensure that the security of these autonomous driving systems 
is protected only in ways that give due regard to the privacy 
concerns of the general public would likewise be crucial to 
securing public acceptance and ensuring the practicability of 
any potential standard.  For example, it is important that the 
transmission of the “Here I am” message by motor vehicles in 
a V2V environment be accomplished in ways that do not 
reveal personal information. 
1. Technical Issue: Sources and Modes of Attack Are 
Unknown, Unpredictable, and Likely to Be Ever-
Changing 
One significant challenge in establishing standards to 
address unauthorized access to electronic control systems in 
vehicles is the rapid pace at which this area of technology 
evolves and the many possible interfaces that can serve as 
potential portals for intrusion.  Unlike the products released 
by the original equipment manufacturers that generally 
adhere to a multi-year product cycle, the methods utilized by 
potential bad actors are constantly evolving.  While 
automakers might begin issuing software updates to their 
vehicles instead of waiting for the next product cycle,132 such 
updates are unlikely to be as unpredictable and numerous as 
the possible changes in tactics used by unknown members of 
the general public seeking to gain unauthorized access to 
vehicle systems regardless of the security measures used.  As 
developing and publishing a rule can often take more than a 
year133 and major revisions to FMVSSs can often contain 
multi-year phase-in schedules,134 it can be extremely difficult 
 
 132. Ford has issued an update to its vehicles already on the market that 
utilize the MyFordTouch system.  See Sharon Silke Carty, Ford Tries to 
Resuscitate Its Image with a Bunch of Thumb Drives, AOL AUTOS (Nov. 7, 
2011), http://autos.aol.com/article/ford-tries-to-resuscitate-image/.  Customers 
are able to update their MyFordTouch system by either bringing the vehicle to a 
Ford dealership or using a USB flash drive they receive from Ford in the mail.  
Id. 
 133. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency 
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, in YALE 
LAW SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 200 (1994), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2167&context=fs
s_papers (“roughly 1.5 person years per agency”). 
 134. See, e.g., Advanced Air Bag Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,680, 30,718 (May 
12, 2000). 
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for regulatory agencies to properly identify the relevant 
security risks of electronic in-vehicle systems and anticipate 
the potential security breaches that can occur over the next 
few years.  Unlike the past, when vehicle systems were 
largely mechanical and subject to the automakers’ multi-year 
product cycle, establishing standards to address the security 
concerns of electronic systems is far less predictable. 
2. Legal and Practical Issues: Providing Protection from 
Unauthorized Intrusions into Autonomous 
Driving Systems 
While the potential security risks with automotive 
electronic systems are unpredictable, there might be certain 
areas in which the agency’s authority to address security 
issues135 could be used in ways that contribute toward 
ensuring a minimum level of protection.  However, 
coordinated action by NHTSA and other entities (such as 
state governments) might provide the most comprehensive 
protection.  In their article discussing the security of vehicle 
electronic systems, Dennis K. Nilsson and Ulf E. Larson opine 
that the priority areas for action in the immediate future 
should be ensuring that external sources of information for 
the vehicle are authenticated and that interfaces that are 
exposed to those external sources are properly guarded 
against unwanted intrusions.136  However, as the authors 
note, there are significant challenges to ensuring that vehicle 
electronic system interfaces are guarded against unwanted 
intrusions in automotive applications because many of these 
applications (such as crash imminent safety applications) 
have little time to spare for firewalls or other protective 
measures.137 
 
 135. The agency’s authority to address security issues was recognized by 
Congress’ inclusion in MAP-21 of a provision directing NHTSA to consider the 
need for establishing safety standards to prevent unauthorized access to the 
electronic systems in passenger motor vehicles.  See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 
31402, 126 Stat. 405.   
 136. See DENNIS K. NILSSON & ULF E. LARSON, A ROADMAP FOR SECURING 
VEHICLES AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS, available at http://varma.ece.cmu.edu/ 
Auto-CPS/Nilsson_Chalmers.pdf.  See also STEPHEN CHECKOWAY ET AL.  
COMPREHENSIVE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES OF AUTOMOTIVE ATTACK SURFACES, 
available at http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf. 
 137. See id. 
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Ensuring that external sources of information are 
authenticated and trusted has been a major focus for the 
Department in its connected vehicle research.138  The program 
envisions a system which uses certificates to ensure that 
sources of information entering into a vehicle are trusted 
sources of information.  It is not difficult to imagine a 
standard that requires vehicles to accept only information 
accompanied by authenticated security certificates in a 
certain fashion or update them at specified intervals.  As 
mentioned earlier, NHTSA is required to establish 
performance standards but can be quite specific in 
establishing such standards in order to meet the need for 
safety.  In this instance, the nature of the safety need 
(ensuring that each source of information for the vehicle’s 
electronic systems is a trusted source) would necessitate quite 
detailed management of certificates and that all vehicles are 
able to communicate with the certificating entity or entities. 
Finally, while NHTSA’s authority extends to the vehicle 
equipment used to ensure security from unauthorized vehicle 
access, NHTSA’s authority to prevent after-market 
modifications to motor vehicles is limited.139  Specifically, 
NHTSA has the authority to prevent manufacturers, 
distributors, dealers and motor vehicle repair businesses from 
making modifications to motor vehicles that would take the 
motor vehicle out of compliance with an FMVSS (that the 
vehicle was certified as compliant with at the time the vehicle 
was manufactured).140 However, private owners of motor 
 
 138. See RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., CERTIFICATE 
MANAGEMENT ENTITY SLIDE SHOW, available at http://www.its.dot.gov/ 
meetings/pdf/BAH_CME_Webinar.pdf.  In the Department’s connected vehicle 
program, vehicles are intended to communicate a safety message to each other 
in order to enable various advanced safety functions.  See Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
(V2V) Communications for Safety, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: RESEARCH & 
INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., http://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/v2v_factsheet.htm 
(last visited June 3, 2012).  Thus, one important issue being explored is how to 
ensure that each vehicle transmitting safety information is a reliable source of 
information.  See id. 
 139. As mentioned above in Part II, the Safety Act expressly prohibits motor 
vehicle repair businesses from “mak[ing] inoperative any part of a device or 
element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment 
in compliance with an applicable [FMVSS] . . . .”  49 U.S.C. § 33012(b) (2006).  
However, private owners of motor vehicles are not precluded from making these 
after-market modifications under this provision of the Act.  See id. 
 140. See id. 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
1470 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
vehicles are not bound under the provision of the Act which 
allows NHTSA to preclude after-market modifications to 
motor vehicles in violation of an established FMVSS.141  While 
NHTSA may establish tamper-resistance requirements in 
FMVSSs to discourage private owners from modifying or 
disabling the safety features in their own vehicles, the agency 
does not have direct authority to prohibit owners from taking 
such actions.142 NHTSA also does not have the direct 
authority to require vehicle owners to maintain safety 
systems on their vehicles. 
Thus, while NHTSA may preclude certain types of actors 
from modifying or providing services to the public that modify 
vehicle security systems (e.g., requiring a vehicle to accept 
certificates to authenticate it as a trustworthy source of 
information), state governments or other entities would have 
the authority to take action to directly ensure that the vehicle 
users on their roads have properly maintained their vehicles 
so that they can participate in the security infrastructure.143  
NHTSA could require that manufacturers ensure that new 
autonomous vehicles are equipped with the latest system 
security updates at the point of sale.  States could 
complement the Federal action by requiring that drivers 
continue to update their vehicle’s security software.  Further, 
the states could more directly ensure that vehicle owners do 
not disable or tamper with an autonomous vehicle’s security 
systems.  NHTSA may be able to establish fairly specific 
standards regarding a vehicle’s minimum level of cyber 
security protection.  However, addressing many of the other 
aspects of cyber security performance may require other 
entities to act in conjunction with NHTSA in order to provide 
an appropriate minimum level of protection. 
 
 141. See id. 
 142. Contrast this provision with the parallel provision in the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A) (2006).  That provision prohibits “any person” from 
removing or rendering inoperative any device or element of design installed on 
or in a new or used motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with 
Federal regulations issued under the Clean Air Act.  Id. 
 143. While NHTSA has established vehicle use standards, see, e.g., 49 C.F.R. 
pt. 570 (2009), these standards do not (by themselves) establish requirements 
upon any person.  See 49 C.F.R. pt. 570.3.  Instead, NHTSA works with the 
states (through vehicle inspection programs) to apply these requirements.  See 
id. 
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3. Privacy Issues: Data and Locational Privacy 
As we discussed in previous sections of this Article, one 
aspect of ensuring that a standard is practicable involves 
ensuring that the public will accept and use the technologies 
being installed to meet that standard.144  While the 
vulnerability of autonomous driving systems to security 
threats has the potential to affect public acceptance, steps to 
reduce that vulnerability can also affect public acceptance.  
This point can be illustrated by an example drawn from 
efforts to address system vulnerabilities in implementing 
vehicle-to-vehicle communications systems.  One potential 
measure for addressing security concerns entails each 
vehicle’s being issued unique security certificates.  To 
implement a system for certificating each transmitter of 
information to a vehicle to ensure that the transmitter is a 
trusted source might raise concerns regarding the impact of 
certificating on the privacy of the participants in this 
network.  Specifically, the broadcasting of a unique security 
certificate by each vehicle has raised concerns that the 
system could be used to track individual drivers.  These 
concerns should be taken into account and addressed in 
making decisions about whether and how to implement such 
a system.  Otherwise, such a system could reduce the public’s 
acceptance of vehicles equipped to send and receive vehicle-
to-vehicle communications.  Autonomous vehicles that do not 
use vehicle-to-vehicle communications might nevertheless 
also present privacy concerns.  To the extent that an 
autonomous driving system relies on GPS to determine its 
location its position on the road and relative to the map, this 
reliance could cause concerns about the possibility of tracking 
(as the existence of a device that generates location 
information might enable the recordation of such 
information).145 
With this in mind, the Department’s connected vehicle 
program has conducted research into the methods available 
 
144. See Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345–46 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979). 
 145. Brief for Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5–8, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012) (No. 10-1259) (protesting regulations requiring that certain trucks be 
equipped with GPS devices). 
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for ensuring both the security of connected vehicles and the 
privacy of the individuals who use these systems.  The 
Department has examined the possibility of separating the 
functions used to create these security certificates to ensure 
anonymity of the users and the reliability of the 
information.146   
Finally, we note that privacy concerns for autonomous 
driving systems (and public acceptance of these systems) are 
not limited to system security functions.  While we have 
described in the preceding two paragraphs how addressing 
potential risks in system security might lead to increased 
concern regarding the protection of private information, 
privacy concerns are not limited to efforts aimed at 
addressing system security risks.  Any FMVSS aimed at 
requiring advanced crash avoidance technologies or 
autonomous driving systems would involve the potential for 
more sophisticated measuring (and potentially recording) of 
safety relevant information regarding the driver’s behavior 
(such as direction, speed, etc.).  Thus, any such FMVSS would 
need to reflect careful consideration of the potential 
collections of information that might be required under the 
FMVSS.  Any such FMVSS should consider whether such 
information needs to be collected and what safeguards would 
be in place to protect this information once it is collected.  
Through this analysis, an FMVSS might be more likely to be 
practicable because the public might be more willing to accept 
advanced technologies (such as autonomous driving 
technologies) when the public is assured that their private 
information will be protected.   
D. Human Machine Interface 
The human machine interface (HMI), for the purposes of 
this Article, represents the process by which the vehicle and 
driver interact and communicate with each other.  The 
interaction between the driver and the vehicle becomes 
increasingly relevant with the adoption of advanced crash 
avoidance technologies and autonomous driving technologies.  
In the future, the driver will likely not only be exposed to an 
increasing amount of messages/warnings from the vehicle, 
 
 146. See generally supra note 138. 
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but also be sharing the driving task with the vehicle.  
Because the human driver can only respond to a finite 
amount of information, at some point additional information 
collected by the vehicle will only be useful if it is used to 
assist the driver with vehicle control.  Further, because the 
vehicle is unlikely to be able to handle all driving conditions 
in the immediate future, the ability of the driver to quickly 
and correctly interpret communications from the autonomous 
vehicle is of paramount importance.  Thus, timely, accurate, 
clear, and non-distracting communications between the driver 
and the vehicle is an issue of increasing importance with the 
progressive incorporation of these technologies in motor 
vehicles. 
1. Technical Issue: Quickly and Smoothly Transferring 
Control Between Driver and Vehicle 
As the vehicle increasingly assists or takes over for the 
human driver (particularly for the performance of safety 
critical functions) ensuring safety will likely require that a 
human be ready and able to step in and assume control of 
vehicle direction and speed with little or even no advance 
notice.  This means that the driver should not only remain 
ready to assume driving tasks, but also should understand 
the interface that the vehicle uses to communicate with the 
driver.  The increased sharing of the driving responsibility 
contributes significantly to the amount of information that 
needs to be communicated between the vehicle and the driver 
and the level of sophistication of that information.  How can 
the vehicle ensure that the driver is ready and able to take 
over the driving task should the driver’s expertise be 
required?  How will the driver receive the relevant 
information regarding the potential safety hazards around 
the vehicle?  Will the driver experience information overload?  
How should the messages be prioritized?  How will the 
vehicle communicate with the driver that he or she needs to 
assume control?  The ability of a vehicle to communicate this 
information and to interact with the driver is critical in the 
implementation of these technologies. 
Even as vehicles increasingly warn, intervene and even 
assume driving responsibility, there are still many scenarios 
that will likely require the driver to assume control of the 
vehicle in the foreseeable future.  Given the current state of 
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technology autonomous driving systems are generally not 
capable of correctly assessing and handling all driving 
scenarios—especially atypical ones, i.e., those that depart 
from those ordinarily encountered in real-world road 
conditions.  For example, an autonomous motor vehicle might 
be able to sense a stoplight color and make the correct 
decision on whether to stop or go.  However, difficulties might 
arise when that vehicle encounters a traffic light that is not 
functioning due to a power outage in the area or a traffic 
officer giving hand signals at an intersection.  Additionally, 
heavy rain or snow could interfere with an autonomous motor 
vehicle’s ability to determine correctly the status of a traffic 
light.  In addition, these systems, like any other systems, 
presumably can be expected to malfunction on occasion.  In 
these situations, the vehicle must be able to recognize the 
malfunction and then alert the driver that the autonomous 
driving system is not functioning and that the driver must 
again assume driving responsibility.  The vehicle design and 
the communications between the vehicle and the driver must 
allow the driver to safely accomplish this transition from 
vehicle to driver control. 
2. Potential Solution: Standardizing the HMI to Ensure 
Consistent Messages and Method of Operation 
and Encourage Appropriate Driver Engagement 
 While additional research would be necessary to 
determine the level of safety need and whether a 
standardized HMI and other minimum performance 
requirements would be able to address that need, NHTSA has 
the authority to require these elements in vehicle equipment 
in order to ensure that the driver can safely assume control of 
the vehicle.  Although NHTSA does not directly regulate 
driver behavior, the agency could influence the extent of 
driver involvement in the driving task using the agency’s 
regulatory authority over vehicle performance.147  For 
 
 147. While NHTSA may not be able to regulate the driver, NHTSA may be 
able to indirectly influence the behavior of the driver through requiring the use 
of new technologies which detect whether drivers are paying attention to the 
driving task.  See, e.g., Howard, supra note 11.  NHTSA also has numerous non-
regulatory initiatives and programs that are intended to, and do, influence 
driver behavior.  One example of this is the agency’s Driver Distraction 
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example, NHTSA would be able to issue performance 
standards or mandate particular items of motor vehicle 
equipment148 to ensure that vehicles are consistent in their 
communications to the driver.  Further, NHTSA could 
exercise this authority by requiring the vehicle to encourage a 
certain level of driver involvement in the driving task.149 
 Standardization of communications between the vehicle 
and the driver, and the manner in which the driver assumes 
driving responsibility from the vehicle could also encourage a 
reasonable level of driver involvement and afford a greater 
likelihood of a smooth transition of the driving responsibility 
from the autonomous driving system to the driver.  Such 
standardization could also help ensure that drivers will 
understand the communications or warnings from the vehicle 
regardless of which vehicle they are in.  
 One method to accomplish these goals is by requiring 
that the HMI of autonomous driving systems possess specific 
standardized elements (i.e., alerts, signals, telltales, switches) 
that make it possible for any driver to understand the 
information being presented by a given vehicle.  While 
standardizing this interaction between the driver and the 
autonomous driving system might constrain vehicle design to 
some degree, it is within the agency’s authority to issue 
performance standards to require the standardization of the 
process as well as any warning lamps or other warning 
devices to the extent necessary to achieve a safety objective.150 
In situations in which standardization of a particular 
process or vehicle feature will lead to an increase in overall 
safety (as it will decrease the likelihood that drivers might 
not understand the communications from the vehicle) NHTSA 
has the authority under the Safety Act to issue standards 
 
Guidelines.  See Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-
Vehicle Electronic Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,200 (Feb. 24, 2012), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/02/24/2012-4017/visual-manual-
nhtsa-driver-distraction-guidelines-for-in-vehicle-electronic-devices. 
 148. “NHTSA’s regulatory authority extends beyond the performance of 
motor vehicles per se, to particular items of equipment.”  Washington v. Dept. of 
Transp., 84 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing examples). 
 149. See e.g., Howard, supra note 11. 
 150. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975) 
(upholding as within NHTSA’s authority under the Safety Act the agency’s 
rulemaking prescribing requirements that particular headlamps must comply 
with specific measurements stated in inches). 
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that (because of the specificity of the performance required) 
might constrain design.151  Such a standard could enable 
drivers to clearly understand autonomous driving systems 
and the scenarios in which the system would require the 
driver to take control of the vehicle.  Should the safety need 
arise, the agency might require additional research to 
determine the most effective form of standardized warning 
that can urge a driver to retake control of an autonomous 
motor vehicle.  However, this regulatory tool is available to 
NHTSA and is one method that can be used to ensure that 
the driver and autonomous driving system understand each 
other.  
E. Retrospective Review to Assess the Effect of New 
Technologies on Benefits of Existing Standards 
In addition to the aforementioned issues, NHTSA’s rules 
are reviewed pursuant to the requirements of Executive 
Orders 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)152 and 13563 
(Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review).153  Both 
Executive Orders instruct federal agencies to conduct cost 
benefit analyses of proposed and final rules in order to help 
ensure that agencies use the least burdensome methods to 
achieve the regulatory end.154  Both also instruct the agencies 
to revise their regulations as circumstances change.  Section 5 
of EO 12866 provides: 
Sec. 5. In order to . . . determine whether regulations 
promulgated by the executive branch of the Federal 
Government have become unjustified or unnecessary as a 
result of changed circumstances . . . , each agency shall 
submit to OIRA a program, consistent with its resources 
and regulatory priorities, under which the agency will 
periodically review its existing significant regulations to 
determine whether any such regulations should be 
modified or  eliminated so as to make the agency’s 
regulatory program more effective in achieving the 
regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater 
 
 151. See id. (holding that standardization of a particular piece of equipment 
on a vehicle is not inconsistent with the mandate in the Safety Act that safety 
standards not dictate vehicle design). 
 152. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
 153. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012). 
 154. See id. 
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alignment with the President’s priorities and the 
principles set forth in this Executive order. 
Section 6 of E.O. 13563 directs the federal agencies to conduct 
a retrospective review of all existing rules periodically.155  The 
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that existing rules 
are analyzed to determine whether they are outmoded, 
ineffective or excessively burdensome and whether or not 
these rules should be modified or repealed.156 
If, as anticipated, the advanced crash avoidance 
technologies and autonomous driving systems significantly 
reduce or mitigate a variety of types of crashes without 
resulting in any significant unintended consequences, the 
benefits associated with many current safety standards are 
likely to decrease.  Since the costs of compliance would be 
generally unaffected, while the lives saved and injuries 
reduced or avoided would decrease, the cost per equivalent 
life saved by these standards would presumably increase.  
Thus, in conducting reviews of its safety standards, NHTSA 
would need to consider how the changes in the estimated 
benefits of each standard affects the cost per equivalent life 
saved and decide whether any of the standards should be 
amended.  For example, if autonomous driving systems were 
capable of assuming the driving task and avoiding many of 
the crashes at speeds higher than a certain speed (such as 20 
or 30 mph), then as the percentage of vehicles equipped with 
those systems increased, it would become increasingly 
appropriate for the agency to consider whether there was a 
need to amend the requirements of various crashworthiness 
standards to reflect changing risks to occupant safety.157 
Similarly, safety measures that might be appropriate 
during the early and middle stages of the progression from 
driver-controlled vehicles to fully automated vehicles appear 
likely to cease to be needed once the end stage is reached.  In 
the former stages, when control is being transferred back and 
 
 155. See id. at 217. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Crashworthiness standards are standards that address the ability of a 
vehicle to protect its occupants in a crash.  See Crashworthiness, NHTSA.GOV, 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/CrashWorthy/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2012); 
Crashworthiness, NHTSA.GOV, http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Crashworth 
iness (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  In contrast, crash avoidance standards are 
intended to help avoid or at least mitigating crashes. 
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forth between the driver and the vehicle as the vehicle passes 
through different driving environments, the ability of the 
driver and the vehicle to anticipate and seamlessly handle the 
transfers of control will be of great safety importance.  
Human factors considerations regarding such matters as 
advance warning of impending transfers of control to the 
driver, situational awareness, compensating behaviors, and 
effects of increasing automation on driver skills might 
necessitate NHTSA’s adopting appropriate regulatory and 
non-regulatory measures.  However, once the progression is 
completed, the significance of the human factor 
considerations will decline substantially because control will 
remain with the vehicle throughout each trip.  The need for 
any regulatory measures adopted to address human factors 
issues in the early and middle stages will theoretically have 
substantially disappeared by the time of the final stage.  At 
that point, the two orders would require the agency to assess 
whether those regulatory measures should be modified or 
repealed and take appropriate action based on the results of 
that assessment. 
V. RECALL AND REMEDY OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND 
EQUIPMENT WITH SAFETY DEFECTS 
Under the Safety Act, a manufacturer’s obligation to 
recall motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 
determined by the manufacturer or NHTSA to have a safety-
related defect158 is separate and distinct from its obligation to 
recall motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 
determined by the manufacturer or NHTSA to fail to comply 
with an applicable safety standard that is in effect at the time 
of manufacture.159  The obligation to recall, which includes 
 
 158. 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2006) (directing the Secretary to require the 
notification, recall and remedy of any motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment 
he or she determines to contain a safety defect or to fail to comply with a safety 
standard and requiring a manufacturer to notify consumers of any motor 
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment the Secretary determines to contain a safety 
defect or to fail to comply with a safety standard).  Id. § 30120 (requiring 
manufacturers of vehicles and motor vehicle equipment to recall and remedy a 
safety defect or noncompliance with a safety standard free of charge). 
 159. See § 30120; United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1351 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (NHTSA “may seek the recall of a motor vehicle either when a vehicle 
has ‘a defect related to motor vehicle safety’ or when a vehicle ‘does not comply 
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the provision of a remedy without charge, defective motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment is not dependent upon 
the agency’s prior issuance of a standard addressing the type 
of performance in which a defect has been found. 
Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a safety standard 
for a particular advanced crash avoidance technology or 
autonomous driving system, the agency could respond to a 
safety problem posed by a vehicle with one of those 
technologies or systems by ordering a recall if it could show 
that there is a defect and that the defect poses an 
unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.160  Determining 
whether one of the technologies or systems is defective would 
present many of the same challenges that the agency would 
face in developing and issuing safety standards for these 
technologies and systems. 
A. Definition of Defect 
A defect “includes any defect in performance, 
construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or 
motor vehicle equipment.”161 It also includes a defect in 
design.162 NHTSA can establish the existence of a defect in 
vehicles or equipment in a variety of ways.  NHTSA 
frequently focuses its investigations on defects in 
performance.  It can identify a broken part of a vehicle or 
 
with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard.’ ”). 
 160. See § 30120. 
 161. § 30102(a)(2). 
 162. In United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), the court recognized the linkages between the term defect and motor 
vehicle safety, and the defect and the remedy.  Both the motor vehicle safety 
definition and the remedy provision refer to design defects.  The term “motor 
vehicle safety” refers to unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the 
“design, construction, or performance” of a motor vehicle.  Wheels, 518 F.2d at 
432.  In view of the linkage, design defects are actionable.   Indeed, the Wheels 
court recognized this in its discussion of the 1974 amendments to the Safety 
Act:  
The remedy without charge requirement is intended to require 
manufacturers to correct at their expense defects in the performance, 
design, or construction of their products which relate to motor vehicle 
safety.  It is not intended that manufacturers be required to make 
corrections if they can establish that the condition requiring correction 
results from the abuse of their products or the failure to adequately 
maintain them.  
Id. at 436. 
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present evidence of a number of occurrences that are 
indicative of problematic performance to establish a defect.   
For example, vehicles or items of equipment have incidences 
of failure of performance and that the failure could not have 
been caused by ordinary wear and tear.163 
In addition to showing the existence of a defect, to compel 
a recall NHTSA must also show that the defect is related to 
motor vehicle safety.  As defined in the Safety Act, motor 
vehicle safety means “the performance of a motor vehicle or 
motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public 
against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of 
the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle, 
and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an 
accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor 
vehicle.”164 This definition encompasses crash avoidance, 
crashworthiness and nonoperational safety.  The concept of 
an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety is broad.165  For 
example, a defect poses an “unreasonable risk to motor 
vehicle safety” if the defect results in a fire that creates a 
potentially hazardous situation to the driver and can be 
reasonably expected to occur again in the future.166  Defects 
that cause a driver to lose control of a motor vehicle even at 
low speeds can pose an unreasonable risk to motor  
 
 163. Wheels, 518 F.2d at 432 (holding that NHTSA is not required to prove 
that the vehicle performance failures occurred during normal use, the agency 
may establish a prima facie case of defect by showing a significant number of 
failures).  After NHTSA has established a defect, the manufacturer may 
attempt to establish, “as an affirmative defense, that the failures were 
attributable to gross and unforeseeable owner abuse or unforeseeable neglect of 
vehicle maintenance.”  Id. 
164.   49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8).   
 165. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Pitman Arms), 561 F.2d 923, 
928–29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that in addition to proving the presence of a 
defect in the vehicle, NHTSA must show that the defect is related to motor 
vehicle safety to initiate a recall).  Motor vehicle safety is defined “as the 
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that 
protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of 
the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle.”  § 30102(a)(8). 
 166. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Carburetors), 565 F.2d 754, 758 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that a defect that caused gasoline to leak out of the 
carburetor onto the engine block creating a fire in the engine compartment 
posed an “unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety”); see also Pitman Arms, 
561 F.2d at 929 (holding that a failure of the vehicle’s steering system that 
caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle was an “unreasonable risk to 
motor vehicle safety). 
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vehicle safety. 167 
Take the following hypothetical example.  A vehicle 
equipped with an advanced crash avoidance technology is 
experiencing a considerable rate of forward collisions.   
NHTSA would need to prove that the vehicle with that 
system was defective and that the defect posed an 
unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety in order to require 
the manufacturer to initiate a recall and remedy the vehicle 
in question. 
B. Establishing a Defect 
Even when attempting to show a defect in a complex 
electronic system, the agency can point to failures in 
performance of a vehicle to establish the defect.168  The agency 
does not need to identify a specific programming, engineering 
or mechanical error to show a defect in a complex autonomous 
or advance crash avoidance system such as the forward 
collision avoidance system in the hypothetical discussed 
above.169  In the event that an algorithm controlling a safety-
critical-vehicle system failed to make the correct 
determination in circumstances that likely would occur in the 
real world, the agency would be able to point to that failure as 
a way of establishing the existence of a defect.170  The agency 
would not need to establish the defect by pointing to a specific 
error in the algorithm flowchart or coding.  As an easy 
example, if the agency could point to some nontrivial 
performance failure in a crash imminent braking system–
such as the system’s engaging the throttle, instead of the 
brake, when the vehicle detected that a crash was imminent–
to establish that the system was defective, the agency would 
not need to offer an engineering explanation for the defect.171  
 
 167. Pitman Arms, 561 F.2d at 929. 
 168. Id.  Viewed another way, the agency does not need to prove causation in 
the tort sense. 
 169. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (X-Cars), 841 F.2d 400, 413 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988). 
 170. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). 
 171. In September 2011, Kia recalled Sorento models from 2007 and 2008 
because the vehicles’ occupant classification system was misclassifying adult 
passengers and deactivating the passenger side airbags.  Jonathan Welch, 
Recall Roundup: Kia, Subaru Report Airbag and Moonroof Flaws, WALL ST. J. 
BLOG (Sept. 16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-
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The agency would then be able to issue a recall order 
assuming as is likely it could also establish that the defect 
posed an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. 
1. Identifying Defects from Performance Failures 
In the case of defects with electronic control systems, 
being able to point to a failure in performance in lieu of a 
specific error in the software coding is important when the 
agency is attempting to show that these systems are 
defective.  Investigating electronic control systems in an 
attempt to uncover specific errors in software coding that 
could be causing a certain performance failure is very time-
consuming and expensive. 
In response to reports of unintended acceleration in 
Toyota vehicles equipped with electronic throttle controls, 
NHTSA arranged to employ the expertise of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct a 
study of the software that controlled the system to determine 
if the software contained any errors that could have caused 
the accelerator control system to malfunction.172  NHTSA 
provided NASA with vehicles purchased from consumers who 
had filed complaints of unintended acceleration with the 
agency.173  The resulting NASA study lasted ten months and 
cost $1.5 million.174  During the course of the study, amongst 
 
seat/2011/09/16/recall-roundup-kia-subaru-report-airbag-and-moonroof-flaws/.  
See also NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., OFFICE OF DEFECT 
INVESTIGATION RESUME (EA-017) (2011), available at http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM404705/INCLA-EA09017-
1909.PDF (summarizing NHTSA’s investigation of the Sorento’s occupant 
classification system).  This is an example of a defect in an electronic control 
system that provided evidence of the failure in performance.  See id.  When the 
occupant classification system misclassified an occupant, a warning light would 
go on indicating that the passenger side air bag was deactivated showing that 
the system was not functioning as intended.  Id. 
 172. See generally NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., NHTSA TOYOTA 
UNINTENDED ACCELERATION INVESTIGATION (2011), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NASA-UA_report.pdf (examining 
whether any design deficiencies in the Toyota Electronic Throttle Control 
System Intelligent could cause unintended acceleration). 
 173. See id. at 19 (describing NASA’s methodology used in studying reports 
of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles). 
 174. See Peter Whoriskey, Report Clears Toyota Electronics, WASH. POST. 
Feb. 9, 2011, at A1 (reporting NASA’s efforts in investigating the link between 
electronic throttle control systems and unintended acceleration). 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
2012] POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF AMVS 1483 
many other activities, NASA examined 280,000 lines of 
software code and subjected the test vehicles to magnetic 
radiation in an attempt to develop an explanation for the 
reported incidents of unintended acceleration.175  NASA 
conducted a fault tree analysis in order to eliminate possible 
explanations of unintended acceleration.176  NASA also used 
logic models to investigate whether the software that 
controlled the electronic throttle controls contained errors 
that could lead to unintended acceleration.177 
If NHTSA needed to provide an engineering explanation 
for every defect in advanced crash avoidance technologies or 
autonomous driving systems, its defect investigations might 
consume the same amount of time and resources used during 
the agency’s investigation of unintended acceleration.  This 
would significantly limit the agency’s ability to induce or 
require manufacturers to recall vehicles with defective 
systems.  That would, in turn, hinder the agency’s efforts to 
ensure the continuing safety of motor vehicles.178 
2. Challenges of Showing Defects from Performance 
Failures Alone 
Now assume that the failure in performance of the 
advanced crash avoidance technology discussed in the 
hypothetical above were not something so obvious as the 
system’s engaging the throttle when it should be engaging the 
brake.  In order to determine if a vehicle were defective, 
NHTSA would ordinarily first identify performance failures 
in specific vehicles or components.  NHTSA often looks to the 
agency’s consumer complaints database and Early Warning 
Reporting database to identify patterns of performance 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. See NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., supra note 172, at 72 (describing the 
system level failures in the throttle control system that would need to occur in 
order for a vehicle to experience unintended acceleration). 
 177. A logic model explores all the possible responses of a system given a set 
of inputs in an attempt to elicit responses that lead to software errors.  See 
NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., supra note 128, at 10. 
 178. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 438 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that requiring NHTSA to show that every performance 
failure was not attributable to owner abuse could have the effect of 
undermining the importance that Congress placed on the agency’s ability to 
order recalls of defective vehicles). 
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failures involving a particular vehicle, vehicle component or 
system that could be attributed to a defect.179 
Once the agency has identified a series of performance 
failures in vehicles with an advanced crash avoidance 
technology or autonomous driving system, it might be 
challenging for the agency to show that these failures were a 
product of a defect (and refute a manufacturer’s contention of 
driver error or some other external factor).180  While the 
agency does not need to provide an engineering explanation 
in order to show a defect, it can be difficult to show the 
underlying performance failure relying on consumer 
complaints alone.181  Because there are many factors that 
influence forward collisions (the failure and performance that 
would point to a defect in a crash imminent braking system), 
it is unclear whether in various circumstances the differences 
in crash rates or consumer complaints would be a sufficient 
means for establishing the failure in performance present in 
the hypothetical failure of the advanced crash avoidance 
technology.   
Some of the target crash scenarios that advanced crash 
avoidance technologies are designed to mitigate include head-
 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (X-Cars), 841 F.2d 400, 407 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that NHTSA based its claim of a performance defect 
in the X-car’s brake system on the volume of consumer complaints that the 
agency received regarding premature rear wheel lock-up); Reporting of Early 
Warning Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (May 29, 2007) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 579) (stating that historically NHTSA identified defects primarily by 
analyzing consumer complaints).  The Transportation Recall Enhancement, 
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, required 
NHTSA to issue rules to establish an early warning reporting system to assist 
the agency in identifying defects in a more expedited manner.  Transportation 
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, Pub. L. 
No. 106-414 (2000) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170 (2006)).  
NHTSA requires manufacturers of vehicles and equipment to notify the agency 
of notices to dealers and consumers concerning defective equipment, foreign 
recalls initiated by the manufacturer, incidences involving the death, injury, 
and property damage, consumer complaints, and warranty claims attributable 
to a specific vehicle component.  49 C.F.R. pt. 579 (2010). 
 180. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(citing the difficulties that the Department of Transportation would have faced 
in proving a defect because the interaction between the driver and the vehicle 
was a critical factor in the complained performance failure). 
 181. See X-Cars, 841 F.2d at 413 (stating that when NHTSA attempts to 
show a defect through circumstantial evidence, the trial court can take into 
account the absence of an engineering explanation in determining whether the 
vehicle is defective). 
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on collisions with vehicles travelling in the opposite direction, 
rear-end collisions with a vehicle that is stopped, decelerating 
or travelling at a lower speed, collisions with vehicles making 
a left turn, collisions with vehicles going straight through a 
vertical junction and collisions with vehicles executing other 
turning maneuvers.182  Because crashes can be attributed to a 
variety of factors or driver error of the second vehicle involved 
in the crash a higher crash rate of a particular vehicle model 
alone might not indicate a failure in performance amounting 
to a defect.183   
In situations in which the agency is attempting to show a 
defect in performance that arguably can be attributable to 
external factors, manufacturers would likely question the 
complaints, arguing that consumers would have difficulty 
determining whether the failure should be attributed to the 
vehicle.184  This seems especially likely when the performance 
failure complained of involves a complex system and the 
agency cannot point to physical or engineering evidence of 
failure.185  On the other hand, if a number of drivers 
explained that a vehicle went haywire, and these problems 
could not fairly be attributed to the driver or another vehicle, 
the agency would not face a particularly difficult burden. 
In the case of the hypothetical failure of the advanced 
crash avoidance technology discussed above that was causing 
an increased number of forward collisions, the manufacturer 
of the vehicle might argue that vehicle speed dictated by the 
 
 182. See ANA MARIA EIGEN & WASSIM G. NAJM, DETAILED ANALYSIS OF 
TARGET CRASHES FOR PRE-CRASH SENSING APPLICATIONS (2009), available at 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv21/09-0248.pdf (identifying crashes 
from the National Automotive Sampling System’s Crashworthiness Data 
System that could be mitigated using forward crash avoidance technologies). 
 183. The World Health Organization identifies excessive speed (either 
exceeding the speed limit or driving too fast for conditions), driver impairment 
or distraction, environmental factors (visibility and road conditions), vehicle 
condition and road design as the leading causes of motor vehicle crashes.  
WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 
76–88 (Margie Peden et al. eds., 2004), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241562609.pdf. 
 184. See X-Cars, 841 F.2d at 412–13 (in the context of brake lock up, 
questioning whether consumers could determine with any degree of accuracy 
what caused the performance failure complained of in that case). 
 185. See id. at 412 (stating that, in order to demonstrate that a defect exists, 
NHTSA must show that performance failure complained of is attributable to the 
vehicle instead of the driver or road conditions). 
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driver, driver error, road conditions, or behavior of other 
vehicles could have prevented the advanced crash avoidance 
technology from functioning as intended.  In fact, because 
many of the crashes that a crash imminent braking system is 
intended to avoid involve a second vehicle, it is likely that 
there would be disputed reconstructions of crashes and 
conflicting views on what went wrong.186 
Because of the number of complex factors that could lead 
to a forward collision, it might be difficult for the driver to 
explain the circumstances and interactions that gave rise to a 
crash and for experts to determine whether the crash should 
be attributable to a failure in the vehicle’s advanced crash 
avoidance technologies or some other factor that prevented 
the vehicle’s systems from avoiding the crash.187  While 
advanced crash avoidance technologies and autonomous 
driving systems are designed to correct for some of the driver 
related factors that contribute to crashes, for multiple vehicle 
crashes driver error could be present in the second vehicle 
and speed and environmental factors could still be crash 
contributors.188  In view of the number of variables, it could be 
challenging for NHTSA to identify the defect and require the 
manufacturer to initiate a recall.189 
3. Identifying the Cause of the Performance Failure: 
Methods and Tools 
NHTSA’s traditional method of identifying defects might 
benefit from additional information to help uncover 
performance failures in advanced crash avoidance 
technologies and autonomous driving systems.  While some 
failures in the performance of algorithms that control these 
 
 186. See EIGEN & NAJM, supra note 182. 
 187. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 183. 
 188. See Tyler Cowen, Can I See Your, License, Registration and C.P.U.?, 
NYTIMES.COM (May 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/ 
business/economy/29view.html (discussing the potential safety benefits of 
advanced crash avoidance and autonomous technologies); see also Interview 
with Larry Page, Co-Founder, Google, & Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, Question 
and Answer at Zeitgeist Americas 2011 (Sept. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=srI6QYfi-HY (highlighting the capabilities of 
the Google autonomous car).  In the interview, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt 
state that the Google autonomous car has better minimum capabilities than 
most human drivers.  Id. 
 189. Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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systems might be evident (and thus manifest themselves in 
consumer complaints or Early Warning Reporting databases), 
other performance failures that vehicles experience might be 
more difficult to identify.  The likelihood of multiple failures 
in performance increases as the information provided by the 
vehicle’s sensors are linked to an ever-expanding number of 
vehicle functions controlled by the vehicle’s onboard 
computers.  If shortcomings in design impact several aspects 
of vehicle performance such as braking, acceleration, and 
steering, it might be more difficult for the agency to identify a 
pattern of performance failures by examining consumer 
complaints or the Early Warning Reporting database, making 
it difficult for the agency to isolate the defect.190 
In order for the agency to identify defects and order 
recalls of defective vehicles in a timely manner, the agency’s 
traditional strategy might benefit from additional tools for 
identifying failures in performance of advanced crash 
avoidance technologies and autonomous driving systems that 
pose an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.  One way 
in which NHTSA would be able to determine if these systems 
were functioning correctly at the time of a crash would be for 
the system to record the vehicle functions and actions taken 
by the computer control system prior to the crash.  NHTSA 
currently relies on event data recorders (EDRs) that collect 
information about vehicle speed, throttle position, seatbelt 
status and airbag deployment in investigating defects.191  The 
 
 190. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 116, at 78 (stating that if the 
failure in performance caused by a defect cannot be traced to the failure of a 
clearly identifiable component, the Early Warning Reporting database may not 
be helpful in alert NHTSA to the existence of the defect). 
 191. NHTSA has issued requirements to standardize the information 
collected by EDRs.  49 C.F.R. pt. 563 (2010).  The agency does not currently 
mandate that vehicles weighing 5500 pounds and less be equipped with an 
EDR.  Id. at pt. 563.3.  Manufacturers currently install EDRs on light vehicles 
on a voluntary basis.  One of the recommendations contained in the National 
Academy of Science report on electronic vehicle control systems was to ensure 
that all new motor vehicles contain EDRs.  TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 
116, at 7.  The report states that EDRs will help NHTSA detect electronic 
failures and intermittent electronic faults that leave no physical evidence of a 
defect.  Id.  According to NHTSA’s research and rulemaking priority plan, the 
agency plans on issuing a proposal to require all new motor vehicles weighing 
5500 pounds and less be equipped with an EDR.  NHTSA VEHICLE SAFETY AND 
FUEL ECONOMY RULEMAKING AND RESEARCH PRIORITY PLAN 20 (2011), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/2011-2013_Vehicle 
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agency uses the information from EDRs to determine the 
factors that contribute to crashes and to monitor the 
performance of safety systems.192  The role of EDRs can be 
potentially expanded in the future in order to provide 
superior information regarding the potential causes of 
performance failures.  Both NHTSA and the manufacturers 
would be able to use the data collected about the behavior of 
these autonomous driving systems to improve the algorithms 
that control these systems and enhance the systems’ response 
to avoid collisions caused by driver error.193  However, as 
discussed above, the agency would need to consider the 
privacy implications of any such expansion and to examine 
what steps could be taken to protect privacy. 
4. Application of NHTSA’s Defect Authority to 
Aftermarket Equipment  
As noted above, NHTSA’s authority to investigate defects 
applies to manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment194 (as 
well as motor vehicles).195 NHTSA applies the same test to 
determine whether a defect is present in an item of motor 
vehicle equipment as it does when investigating defects in 
motor vehicles.196 The Safety Act generally gives NHTSA the 
ability to order recalls of autonomous driving technologies 
 
_Safety-Fuel_Economy_Rulemaking-Research_Priority_Plan.pdf. 
 192. Event Data Recorders, 71 Fed. Reg. 50998 (Aug. 28, 2006) (to be codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563). 
 193. See James K. Kuchar & Ann C. Drumm, The Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System, 16 LINCOLN LAB. J. 277, 283–88 (2007) (studying strategies 
that could enhance the performance of aircraft collision avoidance systems to 
avoid collisions in situations in which the pilot of one aircraft ignores the 
direction provided by the collision avoidance system). 
 194. Reading the terms “motor vehicle” and “replacement equipment” 
together, NHTSA’s defects authority generally extends to the items that are 
considered “motor vehicle equipment.”  See supra note 158.   
 195. 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2006).  The manufacturer can be an entity other than 
the original equipment manufacturer.  Persons who make changes to motor 
vehicles (that are otherwise certified as compliant with applicable FMVSSs) 
before the first sale are considered alterers of the motor vehicle with 
responsibilities to certify compliance with relevant FMVSSs.  See 49 C.F.R. pt. 
567, available at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=8c691a99067 
d5d687f819dceaaefd8e5&rgn=div5&view=text&node=49:6.1.2.3.35&idno=49#49
:6.1.2.3.35.0.7.7.  Further, in certain circumstances, modifications of used 
vehicles are regarded as resulting in the manufacture of a new motor vehicle.  
See 49 C.F.R. 571.7(e) and (f). 
 196. See id. 
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because of defects present in the components of those 
technologies or because of defects attributable to the improper 
installation of the technology by an alterer.  In order to 
establish a defect, NHTSA must show a significant number of 
performance failures.197  Under the Safety Act, the presence of 
a defect is not dependent on the source of the performance 
failure leading to an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle 
safety.198 Thus, a defect can be based on the improper 
assembly of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.199 As 
the components of autonomous driving technology are motor 
vehicle equipment, NHTSA would be able to use the methods 
discussed above to order a recall of autonomous driving 
technology installed (as aftermarket equipment) on a vehicle 
that was not originally manufactured as an autonomous 
vehicle.200 
Because of the potential benefits of autonomous driving 
technology and the potential demand for the technology by 
consumers, it is likely that some manufacturers of 
autonomous driving technology will seek to convert vehicles 
that were not originally manufactured as autonomous 
vehicles to equip them with autonomous driving capabilities.  
If the autonomous driving technologies are not properly 
installed in the aftermarket by an alterer, it is possible that 
the improper installation could be considered to have created 
a defect if it posed an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle 
safety.  If NHTSA could establish a significant number of 
performance failures caused by the improper installation of 
aftermarket autonomous driving technology, the agency 
 
 197. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). 
 198. See § 30102(a)(2) (defining defect as including any “defect in 
performance, construction, a component or material of a motor vehicle or motor 
vehicle equipment”); see also Wheels, 518 F.2d at 432 (stating that the presence 
of a defect can be established based exclusively on the performance of the 
vehicle or equipment).    
 199. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Carburetors), 565 F.2d 754, 756 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that the defect at issue in the case was caused by the 
improper installation of a fuel inlet plug into a carburetor).  The improper 
installation of the fuel inlet plug into the carburetor during manufacturing was 
not isolated to a small number of vehicles.  Id.  General Motors disclosed 665 
fires in 1965 and 1966 Chevrolet and Buick models during the course of the 
litigation.  Id. 
 200. See § 30102(a)(2). 
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would be able to order the recall of that technology.  In such a 
situation, NHTSA could argue that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the autonomous driving technology would be 
improperly installed and that the technology was defective 
because of the number of performance failures.201 
NHTSA’s ability to order the recall of motor vehicle 
equipment because of a defect in the installation of the 
equipment is also important to the agency’s efforts to promote 
vehicle-to-vehicle communications.  Because the benefits of 
any vehicle-to-vehicle communications system depend on the 
penetration of the technology into the on road vehicle fleet, 
aftermarket installations of vehicle-to-vehicle 
communications technology is crucial to increasing the 
penetration of the technology and maximizing its full safety 
benefits.  NHTSA’s ability to order the recall of motor vehicle 
equipment because of a defect in the installation of that 
equipment will help ensure that aftermarket installations of 
autonomous driving and vehicle-to-vehicle communications 
technologies are implemented in a safe manner.   
C. Establishing Unreasonable Risk 
In addition to identifying a defect, NHTSA needs to show 
that the defect poses an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle 
safety in order to induce or (if necessary) require a 
manufacturer to conduct a recall.  The courts likely will look 
at the threatened harm and the frequency of it.  Courts will 
not require a high frequency when the threat is substantial.202  
In some cases, it will be easy to establish that a defect in an 
advanced crash avoidance technology or autonomous driving 
system poses an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.  
The hypothetical of the defect in a crash imminent braking 
system that caused the vehicle to accelerate, instead of 
braking, when a collision was imminent would increase 
danger to the occupants of a vehicle equipped with the 
defective system, as well as to the occupants of other vehicles, 
and be considered an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle 
 
 201. Wheels, 518 F.2d at 438 (stating that NHTSA can establish a defect 
based on performance failures caused by “reasonably-to-be-expected” abuse). 
 202. Carburetors, 565 F.2d at 758; United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. 
(Pitman Arms), 561 F.2d 923, 928–29 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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safety.203  The high likelihood that this defect would not only 
cause a frontal collision, but also increase its severity would 
be considered a severe harm.  A defect of this nature would 
make the vehicle more dangerous than if the vehicle were not 
equipped with the crash imminent braking system in the first 
place. 
Whether a given defect represents an unreasonable risk 
to motor vehicle safety might not always be so clear as in the 
hypothetical described above.  Determining whether a 
defective advanced crash avoidance technology or 
autonomous driving system poses a likelihood of harm might 
depend on the functionality of the system as well as driver 
reliance on that system.  To the extent that a system only 
provides warnings to the driver and does not cause the 
vehicle to take any corrective action itself, driver reliance on 
the system might be a significant issue.   
If driver reliance on an autonomous driving system were 
high, the failure of that system would have greater safety 
consequences.  In the case of a full or close to full automation 
driving system, a failure of that system that would make it 
necessary for the driver to take control of the vehicle would 
likely pose an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.204  
Having become accustomed to relying upon the autonomous 
driving system, drivers might not be able to reacquire 
situational awareness (i.e., awareness of the potential for 
crashes in the immediate driving environment) in a very 
short period of time and take control of their vehicle quickly 
enough when the system fails.205   
It is possible that drivers might come to rely on the 
autonomous driving system to such an extent that they will 
not respond when presented with a situation in which the 
autonomous driving system is no longer in control of the 
 
 203. See Pitman Arms, 561 F.2d at 928 (stating that a “commonsense” 
approach should be used when determining if a defect poses an unreasonable 
risk to motor vehicle safety). 
 204. See Joan Lowry, “Automation Addition” Damaging Pilots’ Flying Skills: 
Report, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2011, 7:48 AM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/30/automation-addiction-dama_0_n_942 
604.html (examining how increased reliance on automated flight systems has 
impacted pilots’ ability to fly without the aid of the automated system). 
 205. See id. (discussing incidents in which the automated flight controls 
failed and the pilot was unable to regain control of the aircraft). 
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vehicle.206  Several factors would compound the risks created 
by the failure of an autonomous driving system.  One is a 
sudden failure.  Another is failure that occurs without the 
driver being given any indication that it has occurred.  
Drivers in the latter situation would likely not realize that 
the autonomous driving system is no longer in control of the 
vehicle until it is too late to avoid a collision. 
Even if the root cause of a defect might be more difficult 
to ascertain than in the era when vehicle systems were 
primarily mechanical, NHTSA generally needs only to point 
to a performance failure to establish a defect.  As driver 
reliance on advanced crash avoidance technologies and 
autonomous driving systems increases, so will the risk of 
harm from the failure of these systems.  While NHTSA might 
need additional data and tools to help determine whether 
there is a failure of performance in connection with certain 
types of defects in these systems, the agency will still be able 
to point to performance failures of these systems as grounds 
for ordering recalls of defective vehicles. 
VI. COMPARATIVE SAFETY PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
PROGRAMS 
A. Role of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) in 
Encouraging Autonomous Motor Vehicle Features 
Public awareness of differences in the relative safety 
performance characteristics between different vehicle models 
through NCAP has helped foster consumer demand for safety 
and strongly encourages manufacturers to build motor 
vehicles that exceed the minimum performance requirements 
in the FMVSSs.  NHTSA has recognized that “the success of 
the NCAP requires change if manufacturers are to be 
continually challenged to make voluntary safety 
improvements to their vehicles.”207  Thus, NHTSA will strive 
to continually update NCAP as necessary to continue to 
“incentiv[ize] and encourage accelerated deployment of these 
 
 206. See generally id. 
 207. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 810 698, THE NEW 
CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR FUTURE PROGRAM 
ENHANCEMENTS 3 (2007). 
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new, advanced technologies.”208 
As advanced crash avoidance technologies are 
increasingly electronic and continue to advance along the 
continuum toward full automation, the foreseeable future 
challenges confronting NCAP will be assessing and 
publicizing the benefits of these advanced technologies that 
are continuously and rapidly evolving.  In addition, many of 
these technologies possess a high level of variation in design 
and composition of safety applications between 
manufacturers.  Thus, determining which of these 
technologies offer the most promise in addressing the most 
frequently occurring crash scenarios might be challenging.  
While these new technologies might have great safety benefit, 
there might be little information and real-world data to 
provide a basis for evaluating the existence of a safety benefit 
and to serve as the basis for NHTSA recommending the 
technology to consumers through NCAP. 
In developing ratings for NCAP, NHTSA is not bound by 
the same statutory requirements that apply when the agency 
issues FMVSSs.209  This gives the agency more flexibility in 
devising NCAP rating criteria and methodologies.  Through 
NCAP, NHTSA could promote a technology that has evident 
safety benefits but which the agency is not yet prepared to 
require as a part of an FMVSS. 
B. Current NCAP 
NCAP provides vehicle crashworthiness information to 
consumers through a rating system based on one to five stars 
(five being the highest rating).  Every year, NCAP rates the 
crashworthiness of selected vehicle models210 and provides a 
 
 208. Consumer Information: New Car Assessment Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 
40,016, 40,033 (July 11, 2008) (emphasis added). 
 209. The statute authorizing NCAP directs NHTSA to maintain a program 
for providing information to consumers on the damage susceptibility and 
crashworthiness of vehicles in order to assist consumers in purchasing vehicles.  
See 49 U.S.C. § 32302 (2006). 
 210. For MY 2012, NCAP will “provide consumer safety information on 
approximately 81 percent of model year 2012 passenger vehicles sold in the 
United States, while rollover tests will provide information on 92 percent of the 
2012 fleet.”  NHTSA Announces Model Year 2012 Vehicles to be Rated Under 
Government 5-Star Safety Ratings Program, NEWS (U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
Washington, D.C.), Oct. 13, 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/communications/pdf/nhtsa1711.pdf.  This 
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vehicle safety score (VSS) star rating.  The VSS is derived 
from a particular vehicle’s combined success on three testing 
criteria: frontal crash, side crash, and rollover resistance.  In 
addition to the overall VSS, NCAP provides independent star 
ratings for the subject vehicle’s success during each one of the 
three crashworthiness tests. 
NCAP also provides information to the public about 
selected advanced crash avoidance technologies.  NHTSA 
selects crash avoidance technologies for inclusion in NCAP’s 
crash avoidance ratings program based on technical maturity 
of the technology, the availability of the technology in the 
current fleet, and the availability of safety effectiveness data 
for the technology. 211  NHTSA has selected three advanced 
crash avoidance technologies to be recommended and 
promoted through NCAP: Electronic Stability Control (ESC), 
Forward Collision Warning (FCW), and Lane Departure 
Warning (LDW).212  These three technologies are currently 
the only advanced crash avoidance technologies that meet the 
agency’s criteria for inclusion in NCAP.213 
Because vehicles equipped with ESC have been available 
for some time, NHTSA was able to rely on real-world data to 
establish ESC’s effectiveness.  In contrast, FCW and LDW are 
relatively new technologies with limited available real-world 
data.  In estimating the safety benefits of these two 
technologies, NHTSA relied on data from large scale field 
operational tests (FOTs).  NHTSA believes “that the FOT 
results for FCW and LDW are applicable for estimating real-
world safety benefits since these technologies were evaluated 
in the same real-world driving environment in which they 
would be deployed.”214  NHTSA also used FOT data and other 
 
means “NHTSA will rate 74 vehicles for the FY 2012 model year . . . .”  Id. 
 211. See CONSUMER INFORMATION; NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, 73 Fed. 
Reg. at 40,016–40,017, 40,033. 
 212. Id. at 40,017. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 40,033.  In general, in an FOT, the major variables impacting a 
technology’s safety benefits, including differences in individual driving styles 
and behavior, system performance, and driver acceptance, are taken into 
account.  Likewise, critical safety incidents (i.e., near-crash incidents that occur 
during the FOT) data are recorded and evaluated to determine if the technology 
provided a safety benefit in terms of critical incident reduction.  Assuming a 
proportional relationship between near-crash events and actual crashes, critical 
incident data are further evaluated using statistical methods to estimate crash 
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agency research to develop test procedures and minimum 
performance criteria in order to validate that technologies 
purporting to be FCW or LDW in fact have the requisite 
performance capabilities.215  Following its evaluation, NHTSA 
concluded that (at that time) it did not yet have enough data 
to recommend other technologies such as “collision mitigation 
braking systems, lane-keeping assist systems, and side object 
detection technologies.”216 
Unlike for traditional crash test ratings, NHTSA does not 
provide vehicle model specific comparative individual or 
overall ratings for advanced crash avoidance technologies as 
it does for a vehicle model’s crashworthiness.217  The current 
NCAP does not rate the crash avoidance capabilities of 
individual vehicles because NHTSA’s current test procedures 
have not been designed to comparatively rate the 
effectiveness of different manufacturers’ advanced crash 
avoidance systems.218  Instead, the agency established 
performance tests to verify that a particular vehicle model 
has systems that possess the minimum qualities and 
characteristics of these technologies.219  A vehicle model’s 
NCAP crashworthiness ratings are supplemented by a symbol 
or symbols indicating which of the three recommended 
advanced crash avoidance technologies are installed on that 
model. 
C. Estimating the Safety Benefits of New Technology as 
Early as the Pre-Production Stage 
As advanced crash avoidance technologies are rapidly 
developing, NHTSA is seeking new ways to estimate safety 
benefits of these technologies.  In addition to using the field 
operational tests discussed above to identify safety benefits of 
emerging technologies earlier, NHTSA has initiated the 
 
reduction benefits.  In the field tests for FCW and LDW systems, NHTSA 
provided technical management and the Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center performed an independent evaluation to estimate safety 
benefits which included rigorous statistical analysis.  Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 40,034. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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Advanced Crash Avoidance Technologies (ACAT I220) research 
program, in conjunction with vehicle manufacturers, to 
develop standardized methodologies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of advanced technologies in mitigating specific 
types of vehicle crashes; and to develop and demonstrate 
objective tests that can verify the safety impact of a real 
system.221 
To accomplish this goal, the agency has focused on 
developing methodologies for estimating safety benefits of 
systems at the pre-production stage by extrapolating the 
results of laboratory tests.222  NHTSA has developed a 
common framework that can be tailored to evaluating the 
safety benefits of each different crash avoidance technology.  
This framework includes identifying crash scenarios that the 
technology is designed to mitigate.223  The methodologies rely 
on computer models, human factors research, and 
performance tests.224  Four research groups have created 
 
 220. Art Carter, Presentation at the SAE Government/Industry Meeting: The 
Advanced Crash Avoidance Technologies Program (Feb. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sae.org/events/gim/presentations/2009/artcarter1.pdf. 
 221. NHTSA’s objective for the ACAT program is to develop a methodology 
for estimating the potential effectiveness of advanced safety technologies 
intended to assist drivers in avoiding crashes.  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 088, ADVANCED CRASH 
AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009) [hereinafter 
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/ 
NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crash%20Avoidance/2009/811088.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP.: NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 454H, 
ADVANCED CRASH AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
HONDA-DRI TEAM (2011) [hereinafter HONDA-DRI TEAM], available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20Avoidance/Technical%20Pub
lications/2011/811454H.pdf.  NHTSA’s prior experience indicates that the 
effectiveness of advanced safety technologies in reducing crashes is not well 
understood.  ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 1; HONDA-DRI TEAM, supra.  ACAT is 
targeted at developing some of the tools needed for calculating the estimated 
benefit of these technologies in relation to the crashes they are intended to 
prevent.  ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 1; HONDA-DRI TEAM, supra. 
 222. See ARTHUR A. CARTER ET AL., SAFETY IMPACT METHODOLOGY (SIM): 
EVALUATION OF PRE-PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 1 (2009), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv21/09-0259.pdf.  In addition “to form[ing] the basis 
for regulatory evaluations of potential new requirements[,]” new SIMs for pre-
production systems can be used: “1) as part of the design process of new 
systems, 2) to evaluate the performance of pre-production systems before 
marketing, 3) to provide guidance to safety advocates, such as NHTSA, on new 
safety improvements . . . .”  Id. 
 223. Id. at 4. 
 224. See id. 
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methodologies within NHTSA’s framework for evaluating 
different crash avoidance technologies or “countermeasures” 
including the Advanced Collision Mitigation Braking System 
Countermeasure, Lane Departure Collision Counter-
measures, Pre-collision Safety System Countermeasures, and 
Backing-Collision Countermeasures.225 
D. Future Role for NCAP in Promoting Advanced Crash 
Avoidance Technologies 
As more advanced crash avoidance technologies are 
introduced into the new vehicle fleet and demonstrate safety 
benefits, NHTSA will be able to decide whether to continue 
its current approach of informing consumers of the presence 
of advanced crash avoidance technologies on a vehicle model 
or to begin comparatively rating vehicle models based on 
their overall ability to avoid crashes.  To some extent, the 
agency’s approach will depend on how the driving public 
views advanced crash avoidance technologies.  Recent focus 
groups conducted by the agency suggest that drivers have yet 
to understand the potential of these technologies.226  Different 
consumers might also place different values on advanced 
crash avoidance technologies and autonomous driving 
systems, based on personal preferences and driving habits.  
In recommending advanced crash avoidance technologies, the 
agency might need to take into account how different driving 
habits and preferences might impact consumers’ choices 
about purchasing vehicles equipped with these technologies. 
If the agency chooses to continue to promote advanced 
crash avoidance technologies by presenting information about 
individual technologies in the same manner as is currently 
used on the NCAP website, the agency will need to develop 
benefit estimates and decide which technologies to list at a 
pace that equals the rate of their penetration into the new 
vehicle fleet.  As these technologies on vehicles will 
increasingly operate in tandem, it might be challenging for 
NHTSA to determine how to apportion the credit among the 
linked technologies for the benefits they generate.  If different 
manufacturers use different combinations of technologies to 
 
 225. See id. at 5–8. 
 226. Id. 
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address similar crash scenarios, the problem of providing 
information that differentiates between available 
technologies will increase.  As the number of crash avoidance 
technologies increases, however, the number of beneficial 
technologies recommended by the agency might increase to 
the point at which consumers could become confused by the 
number of technologies recommended by the agency.227  
Accordingly, the agency might need to shift its approach and 
rate a vehicle’s overall ability to avoid crashes as it currently 
does for a vehicle’s crashworthiness in order to provide 
consumers with meaningful information and to encourage 
continued innovation. 
VII.  NHTSA’S STANDARDS WILL LIKELY INFLUENCE OR BE 
INFLUENCED BY LARGER PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES 
NHTSA inevitably will play a role in influencing the 
manner and pace with which autonomous driving systems are 
developed and introduced.  Even issues relating to driver 
behavior, vehicle maintenance, and vehicle system tampering 
are likely to be influenced by NHTSA’s research and 
regulatory activities as autonomous driving systems become 
more advanced and assume greater driving responsibilities. 
Issues related to driver behavior and maintenance of 
vehicles on public roads are generally the domain of state and 
local governments.  Several States, most recently California, 
have adopted laws governing the testing and operation of 
autonomous vehicles on public roads.228 
 
 227. See id. (explaining that consumers found it difficult to make sense of 
potential NCAP rating involving multiple check marks, star ratings, or grading 
scales even when a reference key is provided). 
 228. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.30, 482A.100 (2012) (defining 
autonomous technology and directing the Department of Motor Vehicles to 
issuing regulations authorizing the operation and testing of autonomous 
vehicles); FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2012) (establishing requirements for autonomous 
vehicles registered in the state and testing requirements). 
    On September 25, 2012, the Governor of California signed legislation 
expressly authorizing the testing on public roads of autonomous vehicles as long 
as their driver’s seat is occupied by a licensed driver.  See 2012 Cal. Stat. 91.  
This legislation requires the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to 
issue, not later than January 1, 2015, regulations establishing a process for 
manufacturers of autonomous vehicles to submit applications to operate 
autonomous vehicles on public roads for purposes other than testing.  See id.  
The legislation prohibits the operation of autonomous vehicles on public roads 
for non-testing purposes until the DMV approves the application of a 
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As the prevalence and sophistication of autonomous 
driving technology increases, NHTSA might find it 
appropriate to issue new FMVSSs to address the performance 
of those technologies.  For example, NHTSA could influence 
the scenarios in which autonomous motor vehicles are 
allowed to operate in autonomous mode through a vehicle 
safety standard.  It would be possible for NHTSA to issue 
standards requiring that an autonomous motor vehicle only 
function in autonomous mode at certain speeds or only on 
roads sensed to be limited access highways.229 
Further, autonomous driving systems might significantly 
increase the importance of motor vehicle maintenance in 
ensuring vehicle safety. It is possible that an autonomous 
motor vehicle’s ability to avoid crashes will depend on 
consistent software updates and hardware upkeep to ensure 
that the vehicle’s autonomous driving system will have the 
necessary information to make decisions about its 
surroundings.  Further, failure to maintain a vehicle’s 
autonomous driving systems can potentially have 
consequences for other road users (especially in a connected 
vehicle environment).  In this situation, the utility of the 
autonomous driving systems and the ability of the systems to 
 
manufacturer of autonomous vehicles pursuant to those regulations.  See id.  
The legislation defines the term “autonomous vehicle manufacturer” as (1) a 
person who manufactures vehicles originally equipped with autonomous 
technology or (2) a person that modifies a vehicle by equipping the vehicle with 
autonomous technology so as to convert it into an autonomous vehicle.  See id.   
    The legislation requires autonomous vehicle manufacturers wishing to obtain 
permission from the DMV for the operation of their autonomous vehicles on 
public roads for non-testing purposes to submit an application to the DMV 
certifying that their autonomous vehicles meet all applicable Federal motor 
vehicle safety standards, have certain capabilities that enable the driver to 
retake control of the vehicle when it is in autonomous mode, are able to notify 
the driver when the vehicle is in autonomous mode, and can capture and store 
from the autonomous technology sensor data for the period thirty seconds prior 
to a crash.  See id.  Finally, the legislation requires the DMV to notify the 
legislature if any manufacturer submits an application for permission to operate 
an autonomous vehicle on public roads without the presence of a driver inside 
the vehicle.  See id. 
 229. NHTSA has issued several safety standards that, while not applicable to 
used vehicles, affect the operation of a vehicle.  The agency can issue standards 
with explicit requirements for when required safety systems must be active and 
when these systems may not be active.  See FMVSS No. 108, Lamps, Reflective 
Devices, and Associated Equipment, 49 C.F.R. § 571.108, para. S5.1.4 (2009) 
(prescribing activation and deactivation requirements for school bus lamps). 
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safely operate would depend on whether the vehicle owner 
updates the vehicle’s software and maintains the vehicle’s 
systems in a timely manner.  It is possible that NHTSA could 
work with states and issue standards to ensure that vehicle 
owners updated the software that controls autonomous 
driving systems by issuing used vehicle standards.230 
In addition, adopting these technologies might also 
increase the importance of preventing vehicle owners from 
tampering with autonomous driving systems.  As autonomous 
driving systems control an increasing number of vehicle 
functions it is possible that some drivers might want to alter 
the decision-making process of the autonomous motor 
vehicle’s computer or otherwise alter the way in which the 
autonomous motor vehicle behaves.231  The likelihood of such 
behavior might increase if, for example, federal or state 
governments chose to require autonomous driving systems be 
activated under certain conditions.  The agency is able to 
prevent manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or motor vehicle 
repair businesses from disabling required safety devices 
installed on vehicles.232  However, this authority does not 
prevent owners from making changes that would disable a 
safety system in their own vehicles.233  While the agency 
might discourage system tampering by establishing a 
standard that requires autonomous driving systems to have a 
certain level of tamper-resistance, additional statutory 
authority or coordinated action with state and local 
governments would be required in order to legally prevent 
owners from tampering with these systems. 
NHTSA will have a variety of choices about the role it 
plays in influencing the manner and pace with which 
autonomous motor vehicles are adopted.  NHTSA could 
choose to promote autonomous driving technologies by 
including these technologies in NCAP, by requiring that 
 
 230. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30126 (2006). 
 231. See Sarah Aue & Frank Douma, ITS and Locational Privacy: 
Suggestions for Peaceful Coexistence, 78 J. TRANSP. L. LOGISTICS & POL’Y 89, 
111 (2011) (describing efforts of vehicle owners to remove ignition interlock 
devices that prevented the vehicle from starting if the driver did not have the 
belt fastened that manufacturers installed on vehicles to meet the passive 
restraint requirements in FMVSS No. 208). 
 232. 49 U.S.C. § 30122 (2006). 
 233. Id. 
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voluntarily installed autonomous driving technologies meet 
specific performance requirements, by requiring that certain 
autonomous driving technologies be installed in motor 
vehicles as mandatory equipment or by defining the types of 
driving environments or conditions in which vehicles will be 
permitted to function in autonomous mode.  These decisions 
will be based on factors such as the maturity of technologies, 
the safety benefits to be gained from the use of these 
technologies, the cost of obtaining those benefits, and the 
extent to which these technologies function without 
unintended safety consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
The advanced crash avoidance technologies and 
autonomous driving systems being incorporated into motor 
vehicles today represent an exciting trend.  There is a great 
potential for autonomous driving technologies to yield 
significant safety benefits.  Autonomous driving technologies 
offer the promise of mitigating the greatest risk factor on the 
highway today—unsafe actions by human drivers.  While 
many of these technologies were not envisioned at the time 
Congress passed the Safety Act, one can see through the 
analysis in this Article that many of the currently available 
regulatory tools can be effectively applied to these new 
technologies.  Although NHTSA would likely need to act in 
conjunction with other entities in order to address some 
aspects of the concerns with privacy, security, and external 
vehicle connections and vehicle maintenance of advanced 
crash avoidance technologies and autonomous driving 
systems in used vehicles, NHTSA’s authority is broad enough 
to address a wide variety of issues affecting the safety of 
vehicles equipped with these technologies and systems.  
Whether, when and how NHTSA exercises its authority to 
regulate autonomous vehicles depends on the results of on-
going research, on the gathering and analyzing of information 
relating to the developing, testing and eventual introducing of 
those vehicles and on policy choices that have yet to be made 
by the agency and the Department of Transportation.  
However, as autonomous vehicle technologies develop, it is 
likely that NHTSA will continue to conduct research, 
eventually develop appropriate performance requirements 
and test procedures, and actively utilize alternatives to direct 
WOOD 11/14/2012  12:53 AM 
1502 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
regulation such as comparative performance information in 
partnership with stakeholders, including manufacturers, 
consumer groups and the states. 
 
